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Martin Feldstein and Andrew Samwick 
HARVARD UNIVERSITY AND NBER; AND DARTMOUTH COLLEGE 
AND NBER 
The Economics of Prefunding Social 
Security and Medicare Benefits 
1. Introduction 
The most profound demographic trend shaping our budgetary and eco- 
nomic future is that older Americans are living much longer. Although 
the maturing of the baby-boom generation will soon accelerate the aging 
of the population, the shift to an older age structure is a permanent 
change that reflects better medical care and improved lifestyles. 
The percentage of the population 65 years old or older is projected to 
rise from 12% now to 20% in 2030, a 65% increase in the relative number 
of individuals eligible for social security retirement benefits and federally 
financed health care. Even more startling is the projected increase in the 
very old, who are the most intensive consumers of medical care. The 
Census Bureau anticipates1 that the group over 75 will rise from 6.1% of 
the population in 2000 to 11.2% by 2050. And the group over 85 is 
expected to rise from 1.6% of the population to 4.6%. 
Under current law, the aging of the American population during the 
next four decades will require doubling the share of national income that 
the government spends on retirement income and healthcare for those 
Martin Feldstein is professor of economics at Harvard University and president of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Andrew Samwick is assistant professor of econom- 
ics at Dartmouth College and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic 
Research. The current paper, which was presented on April 4 at the NBER's 1997 Macro 
Annual conference, extends and supersedes the results presented in Feldstein and Samwick (1996). We are grateful for comments from participants in the Harvard-MIT Public 
Economics Seminar, the 1996 NBER conference on Privatizing Social Security, and the 
participants in the NBER Macro Annual conference, particularly our discussants. 1. These are the Census Bureau's intermediate projections. More rapid medical progress 
and greater changes in lifestyles could significantly accelerate the proportion of older 
persons in the population. 
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who are no longer employed. Since medical costs rise sharply with age, 
the demographic trends will cause the costs of Medicare and Medicaid to 
rise even more rapidly than the retirement costs. 
The social security and Medicare programs now cost 8% of GDP. The 
federal government also spends an additional 0.4% of GDP on means- 
tested Medicaid benefits for the aged. The Congressional Budget Office 
projects that the total cost of these programs will rise to 16% of GDP in 
2030 and to about 18% of GDP in 2050.2 
Financing such an increase in government spending on a pay-as-you- 
go basis would require a tax increase equal to doubling the personal 
income tax or to raising the payroll tax from the current 15.3% of covered 
wages3 to more than 35% even if the higher tax rates did not shrink the 
tax base. While reductions in retirement pensions and improvements in 
the efficiency of the healthcare system could modulate this increase, any 
plausible level of health and retirement benefits would still require very 
burdensome tax rates that would greatly increase the distortions and 
deadweight loss of the overall tax system.4 
The obvious solution to this problem is for individuals to prefund 
these expenditures of old age with a system of mandatory saving ac- 
counts.5 Although the life-cycle model of rational individual behavior 
implies that individuals would do such saving for themselves on a volun- 
tary basis if the government did not provide the current universal bene- 
fits for old age, in reality some individuals would not save adequately for 
their old age, either because of simple shortsightedness or because they 
explicitly decide to consume all of their earnings during their working 
years and then to rely on whatever means-tested public and private 
2. See Congressional Budget Office (1996, p. 78). The projected social security costs are 
based on the "intermediate" assumption of the social security actuaries, which many 
experts believe understate future program costs. The projected healthcare costs are also 
based on optimistic assumptions, particularly the assumption that the healthcare costs 
per Medicare enrollee will decline to the rate of increase of private-sector wages after 
2007. 
3. Covered wages are currently wage and salary income up to $65,400 (in 1997), an amount 
that is indexed with a lag to changes in the average level of covered wages. 
4. The deadweight loss of the payroll tax is the result of changes in labor supply broadly 
defined (including not only labor-force participation and hours but also such things as 
individual effort and risktaking, education, choice of occupation, and choice of location) 
and changes in the form of compensation (substituting fringe benefits and enhanced 
working conditions for taxable cash). The deadweight loss of the personal income tax 
also reflects tax-induced changes in the timing of consumption. The increased dead- 
weight loss due to higher tax rates can therefore be large even if there is no change in 
working hours or in the rate of saving. See Feldstein (1978, 1995b, 1997). 
5. Many countries have shifted to such a system or are considering doing so. These include 
Argentina, Australia, Chile, Japan, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. Sweden has re- 
cently made a step in that direction. For further information on the systems in several of 
these countries, see Feldstein (1996b). 
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assistance will be available after retirement.6 Mandatory individual ac- 
counts would in effect approximate what individuals would rationally 
choose to do if they had adequate foresight and were not diverted by the 
possibility of a means-tested transfer.7 
The present paper examines the basic economics of replacing the exist- 
ing pay-as-you-go system with such mandatory individual funded ac- 
counts. The primary focus is on social security pensions, but Section 9 
extends this to health benefits for the aged. 
Although we have emphasized the term "prefunding" and avoided 
the term "privatize" in this introduction, the system of individual ac- 
counts that we discuss in this paper can be described as "privatizing" 
social security. We regard a system as effectively privatized if benefits are 
based on defined contribution accounts invested in private securities 
with the investments controlled by the individuals themselves.8 The 
current paper emphasizes the advantage of prefunding and does not 
deal with other aspects of privatization such as the matching of invest- 
ments to individual preferences and avoiding the problems of politiciza- 
tion that could come with greater government control. 
2. The Long-Term Outlook for Social Security and Medicare 
Much of the popular discussion and political concern about the outlook 
for social security and Medicare focuses on the projected "insolvency" or 
"bankruptcy" of the system. These programs are now in surplus, taking 
in more in earmarked payroll taxes than they spend on benefits, thus 
reducing the overall federal budget deficit. But by the year 2010, accord- 
ing to the government actuaries, social security benefits will exceed the 
payroll tax receipts. The program will be in deficit and that deficit will 
exacerbate the overall deficit of the federal government. At that time, the 
social security program will begin to draw down the trust fund that it 
has been accumulating since the early 1980s, selling the bonds in the 
trust fund to the public. By the year 2030, the social security trust fund is 
projected to be exhausted. 
6. There is of course an enormous literature on the effect of social security on saving for 
retirement. For a recent comment on this work, see Feldstein (1996a). 
7. Because individuals differ in their tastes, circumstances, and life expectancy, a system of 
mandatory individual accounts can at best be right "on average" and not for each 
individual. Mandatory saving accounts therefore involve some inefficiency even if the 
average level is set correctly. The theoretical alternative of means-tested benefits would 
however also involve distortions to saving and labor-market behavior. An examination 
of these options lies beyond the scope of the current paper. 
8. We recognize that some would reject the "privatize" label in this case because the 
government specifies the amount of the annual contributions and restricts the post- 
retirement payouts. 
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Although the talk of looming social security bankruptcy has increased 
interest in fundamental reform, these notions have little economic mean- 
ing. The social security and Medicare programs are said to be insolvent 
and potentially bankrupt because they use earmarked taxes and a trust 
fund. Other federal programs such as education and defense have no 
earmarked taxes and no trust fund and therefore cannot be seen as 
insolvent or bankrupt. Moreover, the trust fund is simply an accounting 
convention. Once benefits begin to exceed receipts, the social security 
program must borrow from the general public. The trust fund permits 
selling bonds that have in principle been previously set aside for this 
purpose. But the economic impact of the social security deficit will be the 
same after 2010 whether or not such a fund exists. 
Because of the large size of the projected deficits in social security and 
Medicare, the accumulating debt and resulting debt service under cur- 
rent law would grow rapidly, placing an impossible burden on future 
generations. The implication of these deficits has been highlighted by the 
generational account calculations of Auerbach, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff 
(1991). They show that, with no change in existing programs and taxes, 
the generations born after the current year would in the aggregate bear 
net tax burdens of more than 80% of their personal incomes. Since this 
net tax burden is calculated as the difference between the taxes paid and 
the transfer payments received by those individuals, the actual tax rates 
they would face would be even higher. This way of describing the impli- 
cations of the current system makes it very clear that the current arrange- 
ments are simply not viable. 
The calculations of the Congressional Budget Office (1996) show the 
same thing in a more familiar and therefore perhaps more transparent 
way by contrasting the projected primary deficits (i.e., the deficits exclud- 
ing interest on the national debt) and the projected total deficits including 
the interest on the national debt. The basic CBO forecasts are summa- 
rized in Table 1. 
The primary deficit rises in parallel with the growth of the social secu- 
rity and health benefits for the aged, although at a somewhat slower 
rate. The primary deficits in turn cause the national debt to rise, and the 
interest on that higher debt leads to even faster growth of the national 
debt. It is this explosive growth of the national debt and the resulting 
interest cost that explains why the burden on future generations of tax- 
payers rises to such high levels in the generational accounting analysis. 
Table 1 shows clearly that, without the increased budget cost of the 
entitlement programs for the aged (or with an increase of taxes sufficient 
to fund their growth), the primary deficit would not increase and there- 
fore the total deficit would not be on its explosive path. 
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Table 1 SOCIAL SECURITY, HEALTH BENEFITS, AND PROJECTED 
BUDGET DEFICITS 
Percentage of GDP 
Year 2000 2010 2030 2050 
Social security 5 5 7 7 
Medicare and Medicaid 5 6 10 12 
Total 10 11 18 19 
Primary deficit -1 0 4 5 
National debt 51 64 157 311 
Total deficit 2 4 12 19 
The true financial problem of the social security and Medicare pro- 
grams is not the potential for insolvency under the existing system of 
earmarked taxes but the fact that, without fundamental reform, a major 
tax increase would be required to finance these programs as the popula- 
tion ages. The shift to a system of funded benefits based on individual 
accounts would avoid such a tax increase. As the analysis in the next 
section shows, the contributions to such accounts would be very much 
smaller than the taxes needed in a pay-as-you-go system. Moreover, 
because those contributions would be directly linked to the benefits that 
individuals would later receive, the distortionary effects and resulting 
deadweight losses would be further reduced. 
3. A Realistic Transition Path to Prefunded Social Security 
This section describes a method of shifting from the existing pay-as-you- 
go financing of social security retirement benefits to a fully prefunded 
system. The analysis is based on the demographic and economic predic- 
tions of the Bureau of the Census and the Social Security Administra- 
tion, which are described in more detail in Feldstein and Samwick (1996, 
Section 4). We begin by describing how the funded system and the 
transition would look to a typical employee and then present the aggre- 
gate implications for tax rates, fund contributions, and the accumulation 
of the capital stock. 
3.1 THE FULLY FUNDED SYSTEM IN THE LONG RUN 
In the long run, the current pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) system would be 
replaced by a fully funded system in which employees over the age of 30 
(and their employers) make annual contributions to IRA-type accounts 
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that we shall refer to as personal retirement accounts (PRAs).9 The funds in 
these accounts would be invested in the individual's choice of stocks and 
bonds. The income and capital gains on these accounts would not be 
taxed at any time. In addition, the government would contribute to each 
account the extra corporate income tax that would be collected as a result 
of the increased saving. With this rebate of the corporate tax, the ac- 
counts would earn the full pretax real rate of return of 9%.10 When the 
individual reached retirement age, the accumulated fund would be used 
to buy an annuity that earns the same rate of return. 
The level of the annual PRA saving in our calculations is set so that the 
resulting annuity equals the benefits that would be paid under the cur- 
rent PAYGO system. This makes it easy to evaluate the gain from 
prefunding by focusing just on the amounts that employees (and their 
employers) would pay during their working years. In an actual program, 
contributions would probably be set at a higher level so that some of the 
gain from prefunding could be enjoyed during the retirement years. 
The use of a 9% real rate of return in these calculations deserves 
further comment. The real pretax return on capital in the nonfinancial 
corporate sector can be estimated by comparing the sum of interest, 
dividends, retained earnings and all corporate taxes with the replace- 
ment value of the capital stock. For the years 1960 through 1994, this 
averaged 9.3%.11 A 9% real pretax return is also consistent with the long- 
term portfolio returns with which most of us are more familiar. A portfo- 
lio of 60% equity and 40% debt (essentially the financing ratio of nonfi- 
nancial corporations) had a yield of about 5.5% over both the postwar 
period and the period since 1926. Since corporate taxes at the federal, 
state, and local level take approximately 40% of pretax debt and equity 
income (Rippe, 1995), a portfolio return of 5.5% of income corresponds 
to a pretax real return of about 9%. We return in Section 7 to discuss the 
implications of the riskiness of this rate of return. 
With a 9% rate of return, the employer-employee contribution to the 
personal retirement account in the fully funded system that would be 
required over the long term to fund the benefits implied by current law 
9. In our earlier paper (Feldstein and Samwick, 1996) we referred to these accounts as 
Mandatory Individual Retirement Accounts (MIRAs). We have renamed them here to 
avoid the mandatory label because, in principle, individuals would be able to decide 
whether or not they wanted to save in this way or to continue with the existing PAYGO 
system. 
10. An alternative analysis in which the government does not rebate the extra corporate 
revenue is discussed later in this section. 
11. See Rippe (1995). Poterba and Samwick (1995) found a value of 9.2% for the years 1947 
through 1995 and of 8.5% for the more recent period when they ignored property taxes 
paid by corporations. 
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would be just 2.02% of covered wages (instead of the 18.75% required in 
a PAYGO system.12 Since this figure is the result of a complex simulation 
embodying many economic and demographic assumptions, it is useful 
to consider a simple "back of the envelope" calculation that shows the 
plausibility of this remarkable difference. Consider therefore an individ- 
ual who saves at age 45 (representing the midpoint of the years when the 
individual is working and contributing) and subsequently dissaves at 
age 75 (representing the midpoint of the retirement years). Over this 30- 
year interval, one dollar grows at 9% to $13.27. In contrast, as Paul 
Samuelson (1958) taught the economics profession many years ago, the 
PAYGO system provides a return equal to the rate of growth of the tax 
base, i.e., to the rate of growth of average wages plus the rate of growth 
of the number of labor-force participants. Using the 1.1% growth rate of 
GDP assumed for the long run by the social security actuaries13 implies 
that one dollar of PAYGO contributions at age 45 produces benefits of 
$1.35 at age 75. For every dollar of tax that must be paid in a PAYGO 
system, a fully funded system requires only 1.39/13.27 = 0.105 dollars. 
Thus an 18.75% payroll tax could be replaced by a 1.97%-of-payroll 
contribution to a PRA. This calculation produces a result that is remark- 
ably close to the 2.02% PRA contribution calculated with our much more 
elaborate model. 
If the government does not rebate the incremental corporate tax reve- 
nue that results from the additional PRA saving, the rate of return on the 
PRA accounts will be 5.4%. In the long run this would require PRA contri- 
butions of 5.67% of payroll, significantly higher than the 2.02% of payroll 
with the full 9% rate of return, but still very much lower than the 18.75% 
tax with the PAYGO system. Of course, the government would have the 
extra 3.6% of the accumulated PRA balances in new tax receipts with 
which to reduce other taxes or to increase other government spending.14 
In Section 8 we discuss the uncertainty of the portfolio return on the 
12. The 18.75% is our estimate (see Table 2), but replicates the calculations of the Social 
Security Administration. 
13. See Committee on Ways and Means (1996, p. 69). Such a long-term rate of GDP growth 
may seem surprisingly low relative to the 3.1% growth over the past four decades. But 
the recent decades have been characterized by several trends (a rapid growth of 
working-age population, increases in female labor-force participation, and the rise in 
educational attainment) that cannot continue indefinitely. Although we know of no 
other careful forecasts stretching 75 years into the future, it is interesting that the 25- 
year forecast by Data Resources shows GDP growth declining gradually to 1.4 percent 
in 2020. 
14. The 5.4% rate of return would be the full national rate of return on the PRA saving if 
that saving replaced foreign capital in the United States or were itself invested abroad. 
The well-known Feldstein-Horioka (1980) evidence implies that this is not the relevant 
case. 
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assets in the PRAs and show that individuals can be virtually certain 
(i.e., a probability greater than 0.99) to receive at least as much from a 
funded annuity as they would have in social security benefits if they 
contribute less than 3% of covered earnings instead of the 18.75% pay- 
roll tax that would be required in the PAYGO system. Until Section 8 we 
ignore risk in our calculations. 
3.2 THE BASIC TRANSITION PROCESS 
The prospect of making a very low contribution to a PRA instead of 
paying a much higher payroll tax in a PAYGO system is obviously very 
appealing. An important practical consideration, however, is the nature 
of the transition from the existing system to this long-run steady state. A 
common concern is that the transition generation must "pay twice," i.e., 
must continue to pay for the existing retirees while also saving for their 
own retirement. Since the social security payroll tax (excluding the Medi- 
care portion) is now 12.4% of covered wages, this appears to imply that 
the current generation would be required to pay more than 24%. Fortu- 
nately, that perception is false. 
Consider for example the following simple method of phasing in a 
prefunded system by extending it to one annual birth cohort each year: 
the current 30-year-olds begin prefunding their retirement in year 1 of 
the transition, they are joined in year 2 by those who then are 30 years 
old, etc. It is clear that the extra tax that this transition generation would 
have to pay (in addition to the regular PAYGO tax) would be the 2% of 
payroll required to fund their own retirement on the assumption that 
they would receive no PAYGO benefits. 
Such a transition is of course very slow and denies the benefits of 
prefunding to everyone who is over the age of 30 at the time that the 
transition begins. Because prefunding is introduced so slowly, the pres- 
ent value of the benefit of the transition is less than it could be with a 
more rapid phase-in. A variety of alternative transition paths are possi- 
ble. We have selected one to explore what we think combines a moder- 
ate pace of phasing in with a relatively low maximum extra contribution 
rate that starts at only 2.0% of payroll and then declines. 
Before we analyze this particular transition path to a prefunded sys- 
tem, it is helpful to consider a simpler and more rapid transition in 
which there is no phase-in but instead an immediate and complete shift 
to the funded system for all employees. Retirees continue to receive their 
PAYGO benefits, and those employees who have contributed PAYGO 
taxes in the past continue to receive corresponding PAYGO benefits 
when they retire. For those who are over age 30 when the transition 
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begins,15 the funding contributions are set so that the combination of 
their prefunded annuity and the PAYGO benefits will equal the social 
security benefits provided in current law. 
During the transition to a fully funded system, each employee (and 
his/her employer) would continue to make payroll tax payments. The 
amount of the PRA contribution would be taken as a credit against a total 
payroll tax obligation, thereby making it costless to the individual to 
contribute the necessary amount to the PRA. The total payroll tax rate 
would be set in each year so that the net payroll tax available after 
subtracting the PRA contributions would fund the existing social secu- 
rity obligations.16 
Consider first those individuals who are less than 30 years old when 
the transition begins. Since an employee at age 30 is deemed to have 
accrued no rights to future PAYGO benefits,l7 as each birth cohort 
reaches age 30, each individual in that age group would contribute to his 
or her PRA an amount that, accumulating at 9%, would finance an 
annuity at age 65 (also with a yield of 9%) that produces the same 
benefits as would have been provided by the social security system 
under existing law. The annual contribution rate of this group would 
remain constant as they age; i.e., they would buy their retirement annu- 
ities with a level premium as a percentage of wage. This group would 
receive no PAYGO benefits when they retired. 
Those employees who are older than 30 when the transition begins 
would also contribute to PRAs, but at retirement would receive a mix- 
ture of PAYGO benefits and PRA annuity payments. Their PAYGO bene- 
fits would be based on the payroll taxes that they had paid during the 
years before the transition to the funded system began.18 The gap be- 
15. We focus on age 30 because current social security rules base benefits on the taxes paid 
during the 35 years of highest earnings, typically between 30 and 64. We therefore 
assume that individuals do not contribute to the prefunded accounts until they reach 
age 30. 
16. Initially the payroll tax rate would be the sum of 12.4% and the required aggregate PRA 
contributions. When the trust fund is exhausted, the total payroll tax rate would be set 
as the sum of the tax required to meet the remaining PAYGO obligations and the 
required aggregate PRA contributions. 
17. See footnote 15. 
18. The rate of return imputed to these payroll tax payments would be the rate of return 
that individuals in their birth cohort would expect to receive on their lifetime tax 
payments in the existing unfunded system. Although the long-term implicit rate of 
return is the Samuelsonian growth of the tax base, the actual rate of return varies by birth cohort. We use an updated version of the estimated rates of return derived by 
Boskin, Kotlikoff, Puffert, and Shoven (1987) that we have described in Feldstein and 
Samwick (1996, Section 4.3). This implicit return declined from 7.0% among individu- 
als born before 1915 to less than 1.5% among individuals born after 1960. 
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tween these PAYGO benefits and the benefits that they would receive in 
the existing unfunded system would be filled by the PRA annuity. There 
would be no change in their combined PAYGO plus PRA benefits. The 
only thing that would change is the source of the benefits. The PRA 
contributions would be set so that, with a 9% real return, they would 
provide the required level of annuity payments. 
This method of calculating each individual's PRA contribution means 
that during the transition the PRA contribution rate depends on the 
individual's birth cohort. A 55-year-old, for example, would contribute 
3.52% of his covered earnings, while a 40-year-old could contribute 
2.05%. Since these PRA contributions would be credited against the 
individual's total payroll tax liability, these differences in PRA contribu- 
tions would not translate into differences in total obligations. The payroll 
tax rate would instead be adjusted uniformly for everyone. 
3.3 A GRADUAL PHASE-IN TO A FULLY FUNDED SYSTEM 
The transition path that we have analyzed in detail involves a gradual 
phased introduction to the funded system over a 25-year period. The 
basic idea of the phase-in is to start with PRA contributions that are 25% 
of the basic amount (i.e., the amount called for in the immediate phase- 
in described in Section 3.2) and to increase that fraction by 3 percentage 
points a year until it reaches 100% at the end of 25 years.19 Thus, new 
employees reaching age 30 continue to participate in the PAYGO system 
for 25 years after the transition begins. Only after the 25th year of the 
transition do the new 30 year olds cease to accrue PAYGO benefits and 
new retirees come to depend wholly on their PRA annuities. 
Note that this procedure continues to raise the same amount of 
PAYGO revenue as under current law. This permits maintaining the 
same benefit payments to existing retirees and the same path of the trust 
fund (and therefore of the government debt) as under the existing 
PAYGO program. The incremental payroll tax is fully offset by the credits 
for "voluntary" contributions to the PRA accounts. 
Our calculations (based on the detailed assumptions described in Sec- 
tion 4 of Feldstein and Samwick, 1996) indicate that in the first year of 
19. Since each birth cohort pays a level percentage of its earnings, this leads to a phase-in 
by birth cohort. The oldest birth cohort (those who are 64 in the first year of the 
transition) contribute only 25% of the full amount. Those who are 63 years old in the 
first year contribute an appropriately weighted average of 25% and 28% of their earn- 
ings for two years before retiring. Those who are 62 contribute approximately 28% of 
their earnings (an appropriately weighted average of 25%, 28%, and 31%) for the 3 
years before they retire. 
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this phased-in transition20 the total of all PRA contributions would be 
equal to 2.00% of payroll.21 
The second year of the transition differs from the first primarily in that 
those who become 65 have accumulated some funds in their PRAs.22 The 
annuity that these PRA balances generate replaces some of the PAYGO 
benefits. This in turn permits a smaller PAYGO tax.23 
In each successive year, the number of retirees with PRA annuities 
increases and the average size of the annuities increases because the 
retirees have had more years in which to accumulate PRA balances. 
The first phase of the transition is complete at the end of 25 years, 
when all those reaching age 30 make the full PRA contribution and no 
longer anticipate receiving any PAYGO benefits. The second phase of 
the transition is complete at the end of 60 years, when all new retirees 
have completely prefunded their retirement benefits and do not receive 
any PAYGO benefits. The only PAYGO benefits paid after the 60th year 
are to those older retirees who were more than 5 years old when the 
transition began and who would therefore have earned PAYGO benefits 
by the taxes they paid before the 60th year of the transition. 
Despite this very long phase-in, most of the adjustment occurs in the 
first 20 years. By year 19, the total of the PRA contributions and the pay- 
roll taxes required to meet PAYGO benefit obligations is less than the 
12.4% payroll tax under the current PAYGO program. 
Table 2 shows some of the key statistics at selected years from the first 
year to the 75th year. The first row shows the baseline PAYGO tax rate 
that would be required with no shift to prefunding. The rate continues at 
12.4% until the trust fund is exhausted (in year 35) and then rises to the 
level required to fund benefits in each year: 16.22% in year 55, and 
18.75% in year 75. 
Subsequent rows refer to the phased-in transition to the funded PRA 
plan (in which each retiree receives in each year a combination of PAYGO 
benefits and PRA annuity payments that together equal the benefits 
provided in current law). Row 2 shows the net PAYGO tax rate needed to 
20. The transition is calibrated to actual demographic and economic data with 1995 as the 
first year of the transition. 
21. This 2.00% includes both employer and employee contributions; since this division will 
always occur and is of no real economic significance, we shall not refer to it again. 22. The required PAYGO tax is of course affected by demographic and income changes from year to year. 
23. As a practical matter, the annuity benefits after just one year of PRA contribution 
would be so small relative to the administrative costs that it would be more sensible to 
exclude everyone over some age (say 55) from participating in the transition. To sim- 
plify the description, we do not impose any such limit. 
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Table 2 TRANSITION PATH OF TAX RATES, PRA CONTRIBUTIONS, AND 
BENEFITS 
Yeari 1 5 10 15 25 35 55 75 
1. Tax rate with 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 12.40 16.22 18.75 
unfunded 
systemb 
2. Net tax rateb 12.40 12.35 12.12 11.62 9.23 5.29 2.77 0.20 
3. PRA contribu- 2.00 1.85 1.69 1.57 1.48 1.62 1.93 2.02 
tion rateb 
4. Combined tax 14.40 14.20 13.81 13.18 10.71 6.91 4.69 2.23 
and PRA con- 
tribution rateb 
5. PRA benefit 0 1 10 29 135 338 813 1385 
(billions of 
1995 $) 
6. Payroll/em- 20.73 21.57 22.67 23.83 26.32 29.07 35.48 43.29 
ployee (thou- 
sands of 1995 $) 
7. Covered earn- 2927 3156 3453 3752 4273 4789 6064 7526 
ings (billions 
of 1995 $) 
a1995 is year 1. 
bPercent of covered earnings. 
meet the concurrent PAYGO benefit obligations. The tax rate declines 
gradually from 12.4% in the first year of the transition to 11.62 % in year 
15 and 9.23% in year 25. By year 55, the PAYGO tax of only 2.77% of 
payroll finances all of the concurrent benefit obligations. By the 75th 
year, the PAYGO tax is less than 1% of payroll. 
The third row shows aggregate PRA contributions as a percentage of 
payroll, starting with 2.0% of covered earnings in year 1. The PRA contri- 
bution rate then declines to a low of 1.48%, reflecting changes in the 
demographic composition and the number of years that individuals 
have to accumulate annuity funds.24 In the long run, the PRA contribu- 
tion is relatively stable at 2.02% of covered earnings.25 
Row 4 combines the net PAYGO tax and the aggregate PRA contribu- 
tion and shows the combined mandatory payment, starting with 14.4% 
24. Two principal factors are at work in determining the PRA rate in each year: the phase-in 
of the PRA share from 25% to 100% of the basic PRA amount raises the aggregate PRA, 
rate while the decreasing number of individuals who begin to participate at an older 
age reduces the aggregate PRA rate. 
25. With the 5.4% rate of return on the PRA accounts that would be possible without the 
government's rebate of incremental tax revenue, the first-year PRA contribution would 
be 3.93% of payroll. 
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in the first year, just two percentage points of payroll more than the 
current unfunded system. The excess declines gradually, and the total 
mandatory payment drops below the initial 12.4% in year 19. By the 25th 
year, employees are paying 1.69% of payroll less than they would with 
the existing 12.4% payroll tax. The favorable difference between the tax 
under the existing unfunded system (row 1) and the combined pay- 
ments in the transition to the fully funded system then grows rapidly. By 
year 35, the combined PAYGO tax and PRA contribution rate is just 
6.91%, just slightly more than half of the PAYGO tax under the current 
unfunded system. 
Comparing rows 5 and 7 shows that PRA benefits are only about 1% of 
covered earnings in year 15 but rise rapidly to 7% of payroll in year 35 and 
18.4% of payroll in year 75, replacing virtually all the PAYGO benefits. 
3.4 BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES AND THE SIZE OF THE TAX BASE 
The analysis of Table 2 does not reflect the effect of tax rates on the 
amount of taxable income that individuals earn.26 The existing payroll 
tax causes employees to reduce their labor supply (broadly defined to 
include effort, occupational choice, and location as well as the number of 
hours worked) and to substitute untaxed fringe benefits and better work- 
ing conditions for taxable cash compensation. The future increase in the 
payroll tax rates in the PAYGO system would cause a further reduction 
in taxable payroll earnings. In contrast, the shift to a prefunded system 
would reduce the tax distortion and cause a rise in taxable earnings. 
We model these changes in taxable income as the product of an elastic- 
ity and the change in marginal net-of-tax wage (i.e., one minus the 
effective marginal tax rate). The effective marginal tax rate in the system 
includes the federal and state personal income tax rates, the effective 
state and local sales tax rates, and the net payroll tax rate (including the 
portion needed to offset the PRA credits). We assume (quite conserva- 
tively) a 20% rate for taxes other than the payroll tax. The net payroll tax 
rate and the tax equivalence of the PRA contribution require more care- 
ful descriptions. 
The net PAYGO payroll tax rate is the difference between the payroll 
tax payment (12.4% until year 2030 and then the rates shown in row 1 of 
Table 2) and the amount that the individual would have to pay to pur- 
chase the same benefit at the rate of return available in private pensions 
or 401 (k) plans. For example, if the payroll tax payment is 12.4% but the 
same benefits could be purchased in a private annuity for a premium 
26. This discussion follows the analysis previously presented in Feldstein and Samwick 
(1996, Section 5.3). 
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equivalent to 5% of payroll, the net payroll tax is really 7.4% and the 
remaining 5% can be thought of as saving. 
The cost of purchasing the same benefit privately (i.e., the analogue of 
the 5% in the preceding example) is calculated as follows: if the implicit 
rate of return that the individual earns on the social security payroll taxes 
is denoted y, a dollar of payroll tax paid at age a grows to (1 + y)65-a at age 
65. If ann65(y) is the actuarial present value of a dollar a year from age 65 
to death based on a return of y, the dollar of payroll tax paid at age a 
earns an annuity starting at age 65 of (1 + y)65-a/ann 65(y). To purchase 
the same annuity with a private pension plan that earns a return of At, an 
employee or employer would have to spend only [(1 + /)65- /ann 
65(A/)]-1. Because pension funds do not pay tax on their income, a plausi- 
ble value for ,L is the return on capital net of corporate and property taxes 
but before all personal income taxes. A pretax real return of 9% and a 
corporate tax rate (including state and local property taxes) of 40% imply 
-u = 5.4%; this is of course close to the 5.2% return earned on a market- 
weighted mix of stocks and bonds over the past four decades. 
Since ut is substantially greater than y, there is a substantial effective 
tax implied by the payroll tax. For example, since someone born in 1960 
would receive a return on social security taxes of only y = 1.39%, each 
dollar of payroll tax could be replaced by only 21.6 cents of contribution 
to a private pension fund. This implies that 78.4% of the 12.4% payroll 
tax is a pure tax. More generally, we define the effective net payroll tax 
rate as {1 - [(1 + y)/(1 + ,u)]65-a[ann65(tu)/ann65(y)]}rp, where rp is the 
payroll tax rate (currently 0.124). Alternatively, we write the effective net 
payroll tax rate as Tp - 38, where P = [(1 + y)/(l + ,6)]65-a[ann65(,)/ 
ann65(y)]rp is the present actual value of the benefit per dollar of incre- 
mental taxable earnings. Combining this with the marginal personal 
income tax rate (0) implies a net-of-tax share under existing social secu- 
rity rules of 1 - 0 - rP + /. We denote this by No. For example, with 0 = 
0.20, y = 0.0139, and u = 0.054, the net-of-tax share for a current 35- 
year-old is No = 0.703. 
Consider now the net-of-tax share during the transition to a funded 
system. An individual who earns an additional dollar of wage income in 
year t must then pay, in addition to income tax at rate Ot, (1) a payroll tax 
at rate rpt to finance the remaining PAYGO benefit obligations and (2) a 
payroll tax surcharge to offset the revenue lost because individuals re- 
duce their payroll tax obligations by the amount of their PRA contribu- 
tions. We denote the combined PAYGO tax and PRA contribution rate 
(shown in row 4 of Table 2) by r*. The individual's net-of-tax share 
becomes N1 = 1 - 0 - * + /3, where 3 is the same as in the current 
system, since the value of the benefits is unchanged by switching to the 
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PRA system.27 When the transition to the funded system is complete and 
no further PAYGO benefits are being paid, the value of rT becomes the 
PRA contribution rate (which, by assumption, is constant over the work- 
ing life of each birth cohort.) 
We assume that taxable income responds to changes in the net-of-tax 
share with an elasticity of 0.5.28 This implies that taxable income rises by 
a factor of (N1 / No)05. This in turn means that the payroll tax revenue 
collected at the tax rate Tp with the initial labor supply can be collected at 
a lower tax rate 
'p = Tp(N1 / No)-0'5 if N1 > No. Similarly the personal income 
tax rate that yields the same revenue falls to 0' = 0(N1 / No)-05. 
The path of the tax rates is shown in Table 3. The first two rows 
compare net-of-tax shares under the existing PAYGO system (with the 
tax increased to maintain benefits after the trust fund is exhausted) and 
along the transition path. The next two rows show the payroll tax rates 
with no behavioral response (row 3) and with the behavioral response 
implied by the change in the net-of-tax share (row 4). Note that this is the 
pure payroll tax (excluding the PRA surcharge) needed to maintain the 
trust fund along the projected path (and at zero after it is exhausted). The 
personal income tax rate with behavioral response is shown in row 5; 
with no behavioral response, the rate is a constant 0.20. Row 6 shows the 
combined payroll and personal tax rates and the PRA contribution. 
The combination of the PRA contribution and the unchanged year-1 
payroll tax causes the net-of-tax share to fall initially, and that causes 
taxable earnings to decline. The effect is small and is offset by raising the 
payroll tax rate from 12.40% to 12.58%. Similarly, the personal income tax 
27. It is tempting to ask: "What about the high return that the individual receives on his PRA 
contribution? Doesn't that act as a negative marginal tax that should be taken into 
account? For example, in the first year an individual not only pays the PAYGO tax and 
the PRA surcharge (14.4%, shown in row 4 of table 2) but also contributes an amount to 
his PRA account which earns a high 9% rate of return. Shouldn't this reduce the net mar- 
ginal tax rate and imply a higher net-of-tax share?" Unfortunately, the answer to this is 
no. Any individual who earns an extra $100 in year one of the transition pays 14.4 dollars in combined payroll tax and PRA contribution but earns the same incremental benefits in 
retirement as would be earned under the existing PAYGO system. This individual's own 
PRA contribution does not affect his benefits but lowers the future PAYGO taxes of those 
who will be working when he retires. Participating in the transition also means that PRA 
contributions paid by others who are older than he will reduce his PAYGO taxes, but the 
extent to which that happens does not depend on his own earnings. 28. The relevant elasticity is not just the traditional elasticity of working hours with respect to the net-of-tax wage, but includes a broader definition of labor supply (including 
effort, occupation, risktaking, etc.) and the change in taxable income that comes from 
changes in the form of compensation. Although estimates of this elasticity with respect to changes in the income tax are between 1.0 and 1.5 for high-income individuals (Feldstein, 1995a; Auten and Carroll, 1994), we are dealing here with low- and middle- income individuals and with the payroll tax rather than the income tax. We are there- 
fore quite conservative and assume an elasticity of only 0.5. 
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Table 3 EFFECTS OF TAXPAYER BEHAVIOR ON TAX RATES AND 
DEADWEIGHT LOSSa 
Year" 1 5 10 15 25 35 55 75 
1. Net-of-tax share in 71.61 71.49 71.39 71.32 71.27 71.29 67.48 64.96 
PAYGO system 
2. Net-of-tax share 69.61 69.70 69.98 70.54 72.96 76.78 79.07 81.49 
in transition to 
funded PRA 
system 
3. Payroll tax rate 12.40 12.35 12.12 11.62 9.23 5.29 2.77 0.20 
with no behavioral 
response 
4. Payroll tax rate 12.58 12.51 12.24 11.68 9.12 5.10 2.55 0.18 
with behavioral 
response 
5. Personal income 20.29 20.26 20.20 20.11 19.77 19.27 18.47 17.85 
tax rate with behav- 
ioral response 
6. Combined payroll 34.87 34.62 34.13 33.36 30.37 25.99 22.95 20.05 
and personal tax 
rates with behav- 
ioral response plus 
PRA contribution 
7. Change in dead- 0.52 0.47 0.36 0.20 -0.39 -1.15 -2.58 -3.75 
weight loss 
aPercent of covered earnings. 
bYear 1 corresponds to 1995 in the underlying demographic and economic data. 
rate only has to be raised from 20% to 20.29%. By year 20 the increased 
taxable income causes the combination of the payroll tax rate (10.66%) and 
the PRA contribution (1.52%) to be lower than the initial 12.4%. By year 
40, the personal income tax rate is reduced from 20% to 19%. The payroll 
tax rate is also reduced by one-twentieth, from 7.44% to 7.07%. 
The variations in the combined rates of payroll and personal income 
taxes (including the PRA contribution) cause changing distortions in 
labor markets and variations in the deadweight loss of the tax system. 
These changes in deadweight loss are shown in row 7 of Table 3. We 
return to discuss them in Section 4. 
3.5 EFFECTS ON CAPITAL INTENSITY, THE RATE OF RETURN, 
AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
Before considering the welfare economics of the PRA transition and the 
generational distribution of benefits and costs, we examine some of the 
macroeconomic implications of the transition to a funded system. A 
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common criticism of calculations of the type presented in Sections 3.3 
and 3.4 is that they assume a fixed 9% marginal product of capital 
(MPK), whereas the process of capital accumulation in PRA accounts 
would cause the MPK to decline. We analyze that in the current section, 
calculating also the effect on national income and real wages of shifting 
to a funded system. 
To achieve maximum transparency of this analysis, we begin by look- 
ing at the path of accumulated aggregate PRA balances on the assump- 
tion that nothing else is changed. This corresponds to the economic 
assumptions implicit in Table 2. The aggregate PRA balance grows be- 
cause of PRA contributions and the 9% return on the PRA balance and is 
diminished by the payment of PRA annuities. Row 1 of Table 4 repeats 
the aggregate PRA contribution as a percentage of covered earnings. 
Row 2 shows the net flows into the PRA accounts, i.e., the difference 
between contributions and PRA annuities. This net inflow declines from 
the very beginning and becomes negative in the 20th year because the 
earnings on the PRA balances are more than enough to achieve the 
needed growth of the PRA fund. Aggregate PRA balances as a fraction of 
Table 4 EFFECTS OF PRA ACCUMULATION ON THE CAPITAL STOCK 
AND THE MARGINAL PRODUCT OF CAPITAL 
Yeara 1 5 10 15 25 35 55 75 
1. PRA contribu- 2.00 1.85 1.69 1.57 1.48 1.62 1.93 2.02 
tions (percent 
of payroll) 
2. Net inflow to 2.00 1.80 1.41 0.79 -1.66 -5.43 -11.48 -16.37 
PRA accounts 
(percent of pay- 
roll) 
3. Aggregate PRA 2 11 25 41 82 123 188 230 
balance (per- 
cent of payroll) 
4. Percentage in- 0.30 1.63 3.70 6.07 12.14 18.20 27.82 34.04 
crease in capital 
stock 
5. Marginal prod- 8.98 8.89 8.76 8.61 8.26 7.94 7.49 7.22 
uct of capital 
6. Percentage in- 0.07 0.40 0.91 1.48 2.90 4.27 6.33 7.60 
crease in real 
wage rate 
7. Percentage in- -2.89 -2.27 -1.19 0.31 5.48 12.74 25.55 36.62 
crease in real 
disposable wage 
aYear 1 corresponds to 1995 in the underlying demographic and economic data. 
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payroll are shown in row 3, increasing from the initial 2% of payroll to 
100% of payroll in year 28 and to 2.3 times payroll in the long run. 
To understand the possible effect of the accumulating PRA assets on 
the marginal product of capital, we calculate the percentage change in 
the capital stock that would occur if the capital stock rises dollar for 
dollar with the aggregate PRA balance. To estimate the baseline capital 
stock under the existing PAYGO system, we assume that the current 
ratio of covered earnings to GDP remains unchanged at 0.40 and that the 
current ratio of the GDP to the capital stock remains unchanged at 0.37. 
These assumptions imply that the baseline capital stock is 6.76 times 
covered payroll. Comparing the aggregate PRA balances in row 3 with 
this baseline capital stock implies the potential rise of the capital stock 
shown in row 4: 12% in year 25, 28% in year 55, and an essentially stable 
34% after the 75th year. With a Cobb-Douglas technology and a capital 
share of 0.25, the marginal product of capital declines from 9.0% with 
the existing capital stock to 8.3% in year 25, 7.5% in year 55, and 7.2% in 
year 75. 
Thus, even with the assumption that PRA assets add dollar for dollar to 
the capital stock, the decline in the marginal product of capital in the very 
long run is only from 9% to 7.2%. Substituting a 7.2% rate of return for a 
9% return (for the entire transition period) only raises the long-run contri- 
bution rate from 2.02% of payroll to 3.40% of payroll, still less than one- 
fifth of the long-run PAYGO tax rate. 
The increase in the capital stock shown in row 4 and the Cobb-Douglas 
technology imply that the real wage rate is 2.90% higher in year 25 and 
7.6% higher in the very long run. These are shown in row 6 of Table 4. 
These are of course also the proportional increases in the real GDP. 
Although the assumption of the Cobb-Douglas technology implies 
that the shares of capital and labor in GDP remain unchanged, there is a 
substantial redistribution of capital income. All of the extra capital in- 
come is dedicated to paying retirement benefits on wages up to about 
the 90th percentile of the wage distribution. The decline in the rate of 
return depresses the capital income of the owners of "old capital." Since 
this "old capital" is generally owned by those with higher incomes, the 
shift to a funded system would involve a one-time market-driven redistri- 
bution from old-capital owners to workers and an ongoing decline in the 
return that higher-income individuals get on their savings. 
It is interesting to combine the real-income and tax-rate effects to 
calculate the full effect of the shift to a funded system on the disposable 
income of employees. With the current PAYGO system, the combination 
of the 20% income tax and the long-run payroll tax of 18.75% implies 
that a pretax income of 100 produces disposable income of 61.25. With 
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the fully funded system, the pretax income is increased to 107.6. If the 
PRA contribution of 3.40% replaces the PAYGO tax of 18.75%, dispos- 
able income rises from 61.25 to 82.45, an increase of more than one- 
third.29 The time path of such increases is shown in row 7 of Table 4. 
Note that the assumptions of the calculation imply that the retirement 
income would increase by the same proportion as the real wage, i.e., by 
7.6% in the long run. It would of course be possible to reduce consump- 
tion during the working years to balance the increases in retirement and 
preretirement consumption. 
3.6 ENDOGENOUS RESPONSE OF PERSONAL SAVING BEHAVIOR 
In the early part of the transition, individuals experience a decline in 
lifetime income because the sum of the payroll tax and the PRA contribu- 
tion rises while benefits remain unchanged. Later in the transition and in 
the long run, individuals have higher lifetime incomes because the PRA 
replaces the higher payroll tax. Traditional rational life-cycle saving be- 
havior would imply that people respond to their reduced disposable 
income by cutting saving in order to spread the reduction in consump- 
tion to retirement years. 
In fact, however, American households generally do not have the 
financial assets with which to reduce their saving. Even for those near 
retirement, the median financial assets is less than one-half of a year's 
earnings. We have therefore chosen to ignore the potential response of 
saving to changes in current and future taxes. 
Of course, as the transition is completed, the rise in lifetime incomes 
implies that individuals would want to save more during their working 
years to raise the level of retirement consumption. We also do not take 
this into account. 
4. The Welfare Economics of Funding 
Social Security Benefits 
When the transition from a PAYGO system to a funded system of financ- 
ing a given set of retirement benefits has been completed, each birth 
29. This calculation assumes the value of the PRA contribution that would prevail in the 
long run when all PAYGO retirees are gone and when the increased capital stock 
reduces the marginal product of capital to 7.2%. The corresponding figure for year 75 in 
row 7 of Table 4 is based, like all of the other figures in Table 4, on the assumption of a 
9% rate of return (and therefore a PRA contribution of only 2.02%.) A different possibil- 
ity for year 75 would be to recognize that some PAYGO benefits must still be financed; 
with a 7.2% marginal product of capital and PAYGO benefits of 0.20% of payroll, the 
18.75% PAYGO tax would be replaced by a combination of PRA contribution and 
PAYGO tax of 3.61%; even in this case, the real disposable income would rise by 34%. 
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cohort is better off in two important ways. First, the PRA contributions 
require a much smaller annual payment than the corresponding PAYGO 
payroll tax to finance the same benefits. This is a first-order effect that 
would exist even if the existing PAYGO tax did not cause a deadweight 
loss by distorting economic decisions. Second, substituting the smaller 
PRA contributions for the much higher PAYGO tax reduces the dead- 
weight loss that results from distortions to labor supply and to the form 
of compensation. This is also a first-order effect because the payroll tax 
is incremental to the personal income tax, implying that the resulting 
deadweight losses are first-order trapezoids rather than second-order 
triangles.30 
These permanent long-run gains are paid for in part by temporary 
increases in taxes and in deadweight burdens on the birth cohorts in the 
labor force during the early part of the transition. This section discusses 
the path of changes in tax payments and deadweight losses and presents 
alternative present-value calculations. 
The dollar values of the annual changes in the deadweight loss are 
estimated using the traditional Harberger-Browning approximation: 
ADWL = 0.5E(t2 - t2)(1 - to)-1E, where E is the current payroll tax base, to 
= 1 - No = 0 + T - 3 (the marginal tax rate with the existing system), 
and tl = 1 - N1 = 0 + * - / (the marginal tax rate with the PRA system 
and in the transition). These values are presented in row 7 of Table 3. 
At first, the increase in the combined payroll tax and PRA contribution 
raises the annual deadweight loss of the tax system. In the first year, the 
increase is 0.52% of covered wages. Individuals are thus worse off in the 
first year, both because they are paying 2.00% of their wages in addi- 
tional mandatory contributions (as shown in row 3 of Table 2) and be- 
cause doing so increases the deadweight loss by 0.52% of payroll. The 
PRA surcharge and the deadweight loss then decline rapidly. The extra 
deadweight loss is halved by year 13 and is completely gone by year 18. 
By year 25, the lower combined value of the payroll tax and the PRA 
contribution (e = 0.1071 as shown in row 4 of Table 2, instead of Tp = 
0.124) reduces the year's deadweight loss of the tax system by 0.39% of 
covered wages; the individuals' total burden in financing retirement 
consumption is thus down by 2.08% of covered wages. 
30. There is a third effect on employees: the increased capital stock that results from the 
accumulating PRA balances raises the marginal product of labor and therefore the real 
wage of employees. However, since this is (to a first-order approximation) balanced by 
a decline in the return on the existing capital stock, we ignore this rise in wage income. 
More formally, with no induced change in labor in each year Y = f(K,L) implies dY = fK 
dK = r dK. Allowing for second-order effects (on factor prices) implies dY = r dK + K 
dr + L dw, since dL = 0. Thus L dw = -K dr, and these two effects can be ignored in 
evaluating the change in national income. 
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By year 55, the combination of the payroll tax and the PRA contribu- 
tion is down to just 4.69% (vs. an otherwise required PAYGO contribu- 
tion in that year of 16.22%), and the resulting reduction in the dead- 
weight loss is 2.58% of earnings, implying a total reduction in the net 
burden equal to 14.11% of wages. 
Note particularly that by the 75th year the total cost of financing the 
retirement benefits is only 2.23% of wages, while the reduced dead- 
weight loss associated with the reduced cost of financing is 3.75% of 
wages. Thus the reduced deadweight loss is more than enough to pay 
for the entire PRA contribution. The net gain to the individual is thus 
more than 20% of covered payroll: the shift from the 18.75% projected 
payroll tax to the combined payroll tax residual (of 0.20% of payroll) and 
the PRA contribution (of 2.02%), a gain of 16.52% of payroll, plus the 
associated 3.75%-of-payroll reduction in the deadweight loss associated 
with labor-market distortions. 
Table 5 shows the estimated present values of the gains from shifting 
to funded retirement benefits. The analysis distinguishes the present 
value of the reduced tax and PRA contributions (row 1) and the reduced 
deadweight loss (row 2). The present-value calculations take into ac- 
count not only the difference in the tax rate (Tp - rp) but also the growing 
level of taxable earnings (E). Thus the present value of the increased 
spendable income that results from the transition to a funded system 
with unchanged benefits is I(Tp - rT)Et(1 + 8)-, where Et is the level of 
aggregate taxable earnings and 8 is the discount rate. Similarly the pres- 
ent value of the changes in the deadweight losses is X ADWLt (1 + 48)t, 
Table 5 PRESENT VALUE OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS REDUCTIONS 
2% 3% 4% Discount rate 
Years 1-75 75+ All 1-75 75+ All 1-75 75+ All 
Billions of 1995 $ 
1. Reduced tax 10,385 32,672 43,057 5,890 7,518 13,408 3,344 2,410 5,754 
2. Reduced 2,343 8,104 10,447 1,324 1,865 3,189 746 598 1,344 
DWL 
3. Total gain 12,728 40,776 53,504 7,214 9,383 16,597 4,090 3,007 7,097 
Percent of 1995 covered wages 
1. Reduced tax 355 1116 1471 201 257 458 114 82 196 
2. Reduced 80 277 357 45 64 109 25 20 45 
DWL 
3. Total gain 435 1393 1828 246 321 567 139 103 242 
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where the annual change in the deadweight loss [ADWL = 0.5E(t0 - t2) 
(1 - to)-1E] is discussed above. The discounting is to 1995, the first year of 
the transition, and the discounted values are stated both in 1995 dollars 
and as percentages of covered earnings in 1995. 
The appropriate rate of discount should reflect the rate at which the 
marginal utility of additional consumer income declines over time as 
incomes rise. A projection that real per capita income will rise at about 
1% a year suggests a discount rate of 2% (if the elasticity of the marginal 
utility function is taken to be 2) or 3% (if the elasticity of the marginal 
utility function is taken to be 3). Results are also presented in Table 5 for 
a discount rate of 4%.31 
Although numerical simulation results are available for only 75 years, 
the gain from shifting to a funded program continues beyond that time. 
Without the shift, the heavy burden of financing retirement income by a 
high payroll tax and the associated deadweight loss would continue in- 
definitely. To estimate the present value of the gain associated with the 
period after the first 75 years, we assume that without the shift the 
PAYGO tax rate projected for year 75 under the existing system (18.75% of 
covered wages) would continue indefinitely after that date, whereas with 
the shift to a funded system the benefits after year 75 would continue to 
be financed with a PRA contribution of 2.02% of covered wages (the 
projected value for year 75). If aggregate wages grow at g% a year after 
year 75 and the benefits of funding are discounted at rate 8, the present 
value of the reduced payments is 
Vl = (1 + s)-74(r- r)E75 ( + , (4.1) 
where the summation is from t = 1 to t = oo, Tp is the long-run PAYGO tax 
rate of 18.75%, rp is the long-run PRA contribution rate of 2.02%, and E75 
is the aggregate level of covered wages in year 75 ($7526 billion in 1995 
dollars). Similarly, the present value of the deadweight loss reductions 
after year 75 is 
V2 = (1 + 8)-740.5s(-t) (1 - to)-' E7s ( ). (4.2) 
31. A discount rate of 4% would of course correspond to a marginal-utility elasticity of 2 if 
the rate of growth of real per capita income were 2. Although this was the case in the 
past and frequently led to the choice of a discount rate of 4%, the lower real growth rate 
now projected for the future implies that the discount rate should be reduced accord- 
ingly. See footnote 13. 
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Using the social security actuaries' prediction that the growth rate of 
aggregate wages in the middle of the twenty-first century will be only 
about 1.1% a year implies the Vl-values shown in row 1 of Table 5. 
With the 3% discount rate, the overall present-value gain from shifting 
to a funded system is $16.6 trillion at 1995 prices. Most of this net gain 
(about 80%) is the result of the "reduced tax" (i.e., reduced cost of 
funding retirement benefits), and the remainder is the reduction in the 
deadweight loss. About half of the present-value gain is associated with 
the first 75 years, and the remainder with the years that follow. A 4% 
discount rate cuts the gain from funding approximately in half but still 
leaves a very large $7.1 trillion present-value gain, with 60% of that gain 
in the first 75 years. As the discount rate approaches the growth rate, the 
gain becomes explosively large; this is seen with a discount rate of 2%, 
implying a welfare gain from funding of more than $50 trillion. 
The important implication of these calculations is that even though the 
combined payroll tax and PRA contributions have to rise in the early 
decades of the transition, the present value of the net gains and losses is 
clearly a very substantial positive number. 
5. Net Gains by Birth Cohort and the Possibility of a 
Pareto-Improving Transition 
The essential feature of the transition to a funded program of retirement 
benefits is a period of reduced consumption by employees during the 
early years of the transition so that a dedicated capital stock can be 
accumulated. This dedicated capital is then used to finance retirement 
benefits, thereby permitting lower taxes and more consumption by em- 
ployees in later years. 
With the specific very gradual transition path studied in Sections 3 
and 4, the combination of the PRA contributions and the payroll taxes 
remains higher than the 12.4% payroll tax rate in the pure PAYGO pro- 
gram for 18 years. Anyone who is at least 47 years old when the transi- 
tion begins will pay more under our calculations than he would with the 
existing PAYGO system.32 
For younger cohorts, there will initially be higher taxes-plus-PRA con- 
tributions followed by lower tax payments. These changes in tax rates 
affect real incomes directly and also by the associated changes in dead- 
32. This rests on the critical assumption that if the PAYGO system continues there would 
be no adjustment in taxes during the next 18 years and no reduction in benefits after 
that time, but an increase in taxes (after 2030) to maintain the existing benefit rules. If 
either assumption is violated, individuals who are 47 years old or older may be better 
off with the PRA transition than in the pure PAYGO system. 
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weight losses. The time path of net losses followed by net gains is pre- 
sented in Table 6 for three age cohorts, identified by their age in the first 
year of the transition (1995). Each figure in the table shows the net gain 
or loss, including the associated change in deadweight loss, as a percent- 
age of taxable wages. The 55-year-olds have a small net loss in each 
preretirement year. The 40-year-olds have gradually decreasing losses 
for 18 years and then gradually increasing gains. The 25-year-olds are 
required to pay a higher payroll tax in the early years even though they 
are not making PRA contributions until the fifth year. After 18 years of 
higher contributions they enjoy the benefit of rising gains that reach 
more than 8% of their wages before they finally retire at age 65. 
Although the shift to a funded system is unambiguously a bad deal for 
the 55-year-olds (assuming that the alternative is to leave taxes and 
benefits unchanged until 2030), the effect for the other age cohorts de- 
pends on the rate at which they discount future real income changes. 
Table 7 presents the actuarial present values of the net gains for birth 
groups classified by their age at the time that the transition begins. 
Results are presented for four real discount rates from zero through 6%. 
The first part of the table (rows 1 through 3) shows the actuarial present 
values in thousands of 1995 dollars. The second part of the table restates 
those present values as percentages of the present actuarial value of the 
individual's future earnings. 
Except for those who are too young to be working when the transition 
begins, the effect of the shift to a funded system is relatively small. With 
a discount rate of 4%, the present actuarial value of the net loss is 
greatest for the 40-year-olds, but their lifetime loss (expressed as an 
actuarial present value) is only about $5000, or about 1.3% of their future 
wage income. For the very young, the favorable changes are much 
larger: with a 4% discount rate, the net gain to those who are 10 when 
the transition begins has a present actuarial value of $15,230, or about 
4.3% of future wages. 
Although those who are 40 or older are net losers in the transition, the 
Table 6 TIME PATH OF NET GAINS BY DIFFERENT AGE COHORTS 
Percentage of covered earnings 
Age in first year 
of transition Yeara 1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 
55 -2.44 -2.17 -1.68 0 0 0 0 0 0 
40 -2.52 -2.25 -1.75 -0.96 0.27 1.99 0 0 0 
25 -2.62 -2.36 -1.79 -0.99 0.28 2.06 4.23 6.45 8.62 
aYear 1 is 1995. 
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Table 7 ACTUARIAL PRESENT VALUES OF NET GAINS BY AGE AT THE 
START OF THE TRANSITION 
Present value 
Age at 
start: 5 10 15 20 25 30 40 50 55 60 
Thousands of dollars per worker ($1995) 
Discount rate (%) 
0 104.85 77.27 53.03 32.33 16.37 4.97 -5.79 -5.73 -4.06 -2.09 
2 43.37 33.70 23.81 14.11 6.40 0.58 -5.46 -5.13 -3.75 -2.01 
4 18.88 15.23 10.73 5.54 1.51 -1.61 -5.09 -4.64 -3.49 -1.94 
6 8.64 7.10 4.73 1.47 -0.88 -2.65 -4.73 -4.22 -3.25 -1.87 
Percent of future wages (actuarial present value) 
Discount rate (%) 
0 8.28 6.40 4.60 2.93 1.65 0.58 -1.01 -1.87 -2.11 -2.28 
2 7.20 5.31 3.57 2.00 0.95 0.09 -1.18 -1.91 -2.13 -2.28 
4 6.15 4.28 2.60 1.16 0.31 -0.34 -1.34 -1.95 -2.14 -2.28 
6 5.19 3.35 1.75 0.43 -0.24 -0.72 -1.49 -1.98 -2.15 -2.28 
result is quite different if we look at the nuclear family. Combining a 
husband and wife age 40 with two children below age 20 shows a very 
large gain to the family. 
5.1 THE POSSIBILITY OF A PARETO-EFFICIENT TRANSITION TO 
A FUNDED SYSTEM 
Different phase-in schedules can reduce the number of age groups that 
are net losers; the simplest example is a transition that leaves employees 
over some age in the existing PAYGO system. A more interesting ques- 
tion is whether it is possible to structure the transition in such a way that 
all cohorts gain. 
The difficult problem in designing a Pareto-improving transition to a 
funded system is to accumulate funds that can be used to finance future 
retirement benefits (and therefore to reduce the future PAYGO tax) with- 
out making at least one birth cohort permanently worse off in the pro- 
cess. The following example shows that it may be possible to have such a 
Pareto-efficient transition to a fully funded program. This transition path 
is not put forward as optimal or as better than the basic example of 
Section 3, or even as a realistic option, but only to show that a Pareto- 
efficient transition is theoretically feasible.33 
33. We are grateful to Antonio Rangel for discussions about the feasibility of Pareto- 
improving transitions to funded social security. 
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For this analysis we make the empirically plausible assumption that 
individuals do no discretionary saving or that any such saving is not 
altered by the transition to a funded program.34 Individuals over age 40 
when the transition begins remain in the original PAYGO program and 
are completely unaffected by the transition. Each individual employee 
who reaches age 40 is given the option of contributing 5% of earnings to 
a PRA for 10 years in addition to the ordinary payroll tax. The funds earn 
a 9% real rate. At the end of the 10 years, when the individual reaches 
age 50, the individual stops making PRA contributions. Ninety percent 
of the accumulated PRA balance is then used to fund an annuity over the 
next 15 years (from ages 50 through 64) with which to reduce the individ- 
ual's PAYGO taxes. The remaining 10% of the fund is retained and used 
to finance retirement benefits for the individual. The PAYGO benefits 
that the individual receives are reduced by the amount of these PRA 
benefits so that his income in retirement is unaffected. 
Note first that no one is worse off. Those who choose to participate are 
clearly better off, since they have voluntarily chosen to do so (because 
the 9% return exceeds their personal discount rate as well as the net-of- 
tax market rate of return that they could otherwise get). Those individu- 
als who are working after the first cohort of 40-year-olds retires are also 
better off, since their PAYGO taxes can be smaller (because the new 
retirees use the residual 10% of their PRA balances to finance retirement 
annuities that reduce their dependence on PAYGO benefits). 
The ability to achieve a Pareto improvement comes in this example 
from the fact that there is initially a tax on investment income that causes 
individuals to receive a real rate of return that is less than 9% and that 
the prefunding of social security benefits permits circumventing this 
distortionary tax.35 Although it might be objected that the mechanism of 
this example rests on the assumption that individuals will not offset their 
PRA saving by other dissaving, we believe that dissaving such large 
amounts is virtually impossible for most individuals.36 The transition 
34. Recall that median financial assets of households in their immediate preretirement 
years are equal to only about six months of income. Such small balances are most likely 
to be regarded as precautionary savings. 
35. Readers who are familiar with the recent papers of Laurence Kotlikoff on privatizing 
social security (e.g., Kotlikoff, 1996a, 1996b) will recognize that his examples of social 
security privatizations that produce Pareto improvements get those gains by replacing 
a distortionary tax (in his case the payroll tax) with a less distortionary one (a consump- 
tion tax that raises a substantial amount of revenue during the transition by taxing old 
capital, i.e., by a lump-sum wealth tax). 
36. See footnote 34. Antonio Rangel has suggested a modification of our example that 
would also lead to a Pareto improvement even if individuals are savers who could in 
principle offset the mandatory PRA accumulation with reductions in other saving. 
Rangel's solution to this problem is to replace the 10%-of-payroll PRA contribution 
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implied by this example is extremely slow, and more rapid transitions 
that made no cohort worse off could no doubt be devised. It is not clear, 
however, that doing so would be more desirable than a transition with a 
greater net welfare gain that is not Pareto-efficient. 
6. Recognition Bonds and Alternative Transition Financing 
The use of recognition bonds is an alternative administrative mechanism to 
the gradual transition described in this paper. It is part of a broader class 
of transition mechanisms that combine the gradual transition of the type 
modeled in Section 3.3 with the use of government debt to shift the 
burden of the transition to the more distant future. 
A recognition bond is a government bond given to employees at the 
time that a PAYGO social security program is terminated as compensa- 
tion for the loss of future benefits or as compensation for the PAYGO 
taxes that these individuals previously paid. The concept was first sug- 
gested by James Buchanan and has actually been used in Chile and 
Argentina. 
Unlike the gradual transition of Section 3.3, the existing PAYGO system 
could be ended completely and replaced with an exclusively funded sys- 
tem. Individuals would then be given recognition bonds with which they 
could in principle purchase (from a private financial institution) a single- 
premium annuity that would begin its payments at age 65. The most 
natural definition of an appropriate recognition bond would be one that is 
equal to the present actuarial value of the benefits to which the individual 
is entitled under the PAYGO system. If the value of such a recognition 
bond were calculated by discounting future benefits at the same rate at 
which the market is willing to sell a single-premium annuity, the recogni- 
tion bond would permit the individual to receive the same benefits that he 
or she would get from the existing PAYGO program. 
Three further requirements would make the recognition-bond ap- 
proach exactly identical to the gradual transition of Section 4. First, each 
individual would be required to purchase such an annuity. Second, the 
with an offer by the government to permit individuals to receive a 9% rate of return on 
saving in excess of what they would otherwise have done. In practice, there would be 
problems of dealing with previously accumulated assets as well as annual saving flows. Samwick (1996) simulates the effects of several reforms in which households buy themselves out of their existing PAYGO obligations with contributions to PRAs. As in 
Rangel's example, the reduction in the PAYGO tax is a convex function of the amount 
contributed. Samwick shows that governments will typically find it optimal to offer different schedules simultaneously to those for whom social security contributions are 
marginal and inframarginal in order to maximize participation while minimizing the 
reduction in other saving that may occur. 
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individual would be required to make the same contribution to a PRA as 
provided in Section 4, so that the combination of the PRA annuity and 
the recognition-bond annuity exactly replaced the original PAYGO bene- 
fits. Third, a payroll tax at the same annual rates as used in the Section 4 
transition would be used to finance the principal and interest payments 
on the recognition bonds. 
These equivalence requirements indicate some alternative transition 
paths that could be achieved with the help of recognition bonds or, more 
generally, with the use of explicit government debt as part of the transi- 
tion. For example, the government could shift some of the burden of the 
transition from the initial generation of employees to future employees 
by borrowing some of the funds needed to meet the PAYGO benefits and 
then amortizing that debt very slowly or not at all. An additional oppor- 
tunity presented by recognition bonds or by other government debt is to 
substitute the personal income tax or some other tax for the payroll tax in 
servicing the explicit debt. 
In considering the possible role of explicit government debt it is impor- 
tant to recognize the true cost of using government borrowing. Al- 
though government borrowing may appear to have only a low cost 
because of the low interest rate that the government pays, the crowding 
out of private investment by government borrowing precludes invest- 
ments that would be expected to earn the 9% real rate of return. We shall 
not examine the possible uses of debt further at this time. 
Table 8 presents estimates of the value of recognition bonds for the 
United States as of 1995. The table shows the value of the bonds that 
would be payable to individuals at selected ages from 30 through 75 (in 
thousands of 1995 dollars) as well as the aggregate value of the bonds (in 
trillions of 1995 dollars). The first four columns are based on a real 
interest rate of 2%, essentially the real rate of interest paid on govern- 
ment bonds during the past four decades. The second four columns are 
based on a real interest rate of 4%. 
The recognition-bond values in column 1 are the accumulated value of 
past payroll tax payments. Thus the average 45-year-old in 1995 had paid 
(together with his employers) taxes which, when accumulated with inter- 
est at 2%, had a cumulated value of $63,830. The aggregate value of the 
claims of all current employees calculated in this way is $6.703 trillion. For 
retirees we cumulate the taxes that they and their employers paid and 
subtract the benefits that they are deemed to have received after age 64. 
The aggregate value of the remaining claims of the retirees is an addi- 
tional $1.390 trillion. The total value of the potential recognition bonds 
calculated in this way is thus $8.094 trillion. Using a 4% rate to cumulate 
Table 8 BACKWARD-LOOKING AND FORWARD-LOOKING RECOGNITION BONDS 
Value of Bond ($) 
Interest rate 2% Interest rate 4% 
Backward- Forward-looking bond kwd Forward-looking bond 
looking Gross Net looking Gross Net 
Age bond SSW SS tax SSW bond SSW SS tax SSW 
30 19,950 98,580 79,190 19,390 21,540 41,080 59,570 -18,490 
45 63,830 120,060 45,860 74,200 78,920 67,890 39,090 28,800 
60 94,980 157,870 10,980 146,890 133,540 119,660 10,580 109,080 
75 3,270 72,460 0 72,460 48,830 63,770 0 63,770 
Totals in trillions of 1995 dollars 
Workers 6.703 16.317 7.949 8.369 8.474 8.905 6.227 3.838a 
Retirees 1.390 3.631 0 3.630 2.785 3.153 0.000 3.153 
Total 8.094 19.948 7.949 11.999 11.259 12.058 6.227 6.991a 
aExcludes individuals with negative net social security wealth. 
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past taxes (net of the benefits received by current retirees) produces a 
total recognition-bond debt of $11.259 trillion (shown in column 5). 
The alternative to this backward-looking recognition bond is a forward- 
looking recognition bond based on the net future benefits to which the 
individuals are entitled on the basis of the taxes that they have already 
paid. Our calculation applies the cohort-specific PAYGO rate of return 
(see footnote 18 above) to the taxes that the individuals in that cohort 
would pay to calculate the benefits to which they would be entitled in 
retirement. The present actuarial value of those benefits is the gross social 
security wealth shown in column 2. The individuals who are 45 years old 
in 1995 are entitled to benefits under current law that have an actuarial 
present value of $120,060 when discounted at 2%. However, before retir- 
ing they would pay additional taxes with an actuarial present value of 
$45,860. Their net social security wealth is thus $74,200, and that would 
be the appropriate value of the forward-looking recognition bond. The 
cumulative value of such net social security forward-looking recognition 
bonds, when discounting at 2%, is $11.999 trillion. That this amount is 
larger than the aggregate of backward-looking recognition bonds shows 
that the current generation of employees and retirees can expect to re- 
ceive a real return greater than 2% in the existing program. A more 
detailed comparison by age shows that this is only true above a certain 
age, with those in their early thirties or younger receiving a real return of 
less than 2%. 
Applying a 4% discount rate to calculate forward-looking recognition 
bonds gives a very different result. No working age cohort can expect to 
receive a real return as high as 4%. Individuals who are less than 35 
years old have negative net social security wealth (the present value of 
their future taxes exceeds the present value of the benefits when dis- 
counted at 4%) and would receive no recognition bonds. The aggregate 
value of the forward-looking recognition bonds paid to the remaining 
workers and retirees would be only $3.838 trillion, about half the value 
of the backward-looking recognition bonds calculated with a 4% rate of 
interest. 
7. Social Security Prefunding and Low-Wage Workers 
The prefunded system of benefits based on individual accounts that is 
described in Section 3 involves no redistributions and makes retirement 
annuities proportional to pre6etirement earnings. It is possible however 
to introduce a variety of modifications that can make prefunding even 
more advantageous to low-wage workers than to those with average and 
above-average wages. 
The Economics of Prefunding Social Security and Medicare Benefits * 145 
In a previous paper (Feldstein and Samwick, 1996) we used data on 
the distribution of lifetime earnings to calculate the distribution of PRA 
fund values at age 65. We found that 19% of accounts had less than half 
of the value of the median account. The cost of supplementing all such 
low-value accounts by enough to bring them up to half of the median 
value could be financed by a one-time tax of 4.7% on all PRA accounts at 
age 65. Each individual could save enough to provide for his own PRA 
annuity and to finance that one-time tax by raising his PRA contribution 
rate by 4.7%; in the current calculation, the long-run PRA contribution 
would have to rise from 2.02% to 2.1% of payroll. 
In the present paper we pursue a very different approach and ask how 
a low-income worker might fare in a funded system and what would 
have to be done to provide the same level of retirement benefits that 
such workers receive in the existing PAYGO system. For this purpose, 
we follow the Social Security Administration and define a low-wage 
worker as someone with 45% of average covered earnings, i.e., with 
earnings of only $11,617 in 1996. Under current law, such individuals 
receive benefits equal to 55% of their immediate preretirement income if 
they have no dependents and 83% of that preretirement income with a 
dependent spouse. 
Consider first the fraction of earnings that such a low-wage worker 
would have to contribute to a PRA account from ages 30 to 65 to finance 
an annuity equal to 83% of preretirement earnings from age 65 to death. 
To provide an explicit and transparent calculation, we avoid the complex- 
ity of an actuarial annuity and assume instead that the individual re- 
ceives a fixed annuity for 20 years starting at age 65. If the low-income 
individual's wage grows at 1% a year from age 30 to age 64 and the PRA 
account earns a real return of 9%, the value of the PRA account at age 65 
is cw 135(1.01)'(1.09)35-t, where c is the proportion of the wage that is 
saved in the PRA each year and w is the wage at age 30. If the annuity is 
to be 83% of the immediate preretirement wage, i.e., 0.83w(1.01)35, for 20 
years, the value of c must satisfy c L5(1.01)t(1.09)35- = 0.83(1.01)35 
120(1.09)-t. This implies c = 0.045. Thus even with no redistribution, the 
low-wage earner could obtain the 83% replacement rate of the current 
PAYGO system with a PRA contribution of only 4.5% of wages instead of 
the 18.75% long-term contribution implied by current law and PAYGO 
financing. The low-wage earner would thus have an increase in dispos- 
able income equal to more than 14% of earnings. 
The idea that the low-wage workers would be required to make higher 
proportional contributions to their PRAs than higher-wage workers 
might be politically unacceptable even though such contributions would 
be very much less than they would have been in the PAYGO system. We 
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therefore ask how their rate of return would have to be augmented by an 
explicit transfer to produce the 83% replacement rate if the low-wage 
worker made the same PRA contribution as a percent of payroll as every- 
one else. This incremental return might come from the additional 
corporate-income-tax revenue that the government collects as a result of 
the PRA capital by giving more of that extra tax to lower-income individu- 
als and less to those with higher incomes. 
If the low wage earner contributes 2% of earnings to a PRA and ob- 
tains a return of R% on his PRA balances, at the time of retirement the 
balance in the account would be 0.02w ;35(1.01)t (1 + R)35-t . If benefits are 
to be 0.83(1.01)35w for 20 years, R must satisfy 0.02w ,35(1.01)t (1 + R)35-t = 
0.83(1.01)w35w 1(l + R)-t. This implies that the required rate of return for 
the low wage earner would be R = 0.118. In short, if the government 
used part of the incremental corporate income tax revenue (equal to 
about 3.5% of all PRA assets) to increase the rate of return on the assets 
of the low-wage earners by 2.8 percentage points, the low-income earner 
could obtain the same 83% replacement rate as under existing law with a 
contribution of only 2% of earnings. 
There are undoubtedly other and better ways to achieve any desired 
redistribution to supplement the benefits of low-wage earners. Although 
we will not explore this issue further here, we believe that the calcula- 
tions in this section show that a prefunded system can provide the same 
level of retirement income to low-wage earners as the current PAYGO 
system with at least 14% higher income during preretirement years or 
some combination of higher income during both retirement and pre- 
retirement years. 
8. Medicare 
Although we have focused our detailed analysis on the prefunding of 
social security benefits, we believe that the same logic can be applied to 
financing the healthcare benefits of the aged. As we noted in Section 1, 
the cost of funding healthcare for the aged on a PAYGO basis would 
eventually require a payroll tax equal to about 12% of GDP, or about 30% 
of covered earnings. 
Since the long-run projected cost of the healthcare programs for the 
aged is about 170% of the long-run level of aggregate social security bene- 
fits, a first approximation of the payroll contributions needed to fund 
these health benefits is 170% of the PRA contributions that are required to 
fund the social security retirement benefits. This implies contributions to 
a personal retirement health account (PRHA) of 3.4% of taxable payroll. The 
funds accumulated in this way could be used to purchase conventional 
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insurance like the existing Medicare coverage plus the long-term care 
insurance currently provided by Medicaid. Alternatively, the funds could 
pay for membership in a health maintenance organization or could be 
used in conjunction with high-deductible health insurance policies as a 
way of achieving greater self-control over health expenditures. Although 
the precise way in which the accumulated funds are translated into the 
financing of healthcare is very important, it is secondary to the financing 
issue that we consider here. 
One further point that does need discussion here is that the health 
benefits provided by Medicare, unlike the cash retirement benefits, are 
not related to earnings during working years. The 3.4% of payroll contri- 
bution to a PRHA would therefore provide a larger than needed fund for 
those with above-average earnings but an inadequate fund for those 
with below-average earnings. One possible solution to this problem is to 
redistribute the contribution so that each individual pays 3.4% of his 
earnings up to the maximum taxable earnings for social security ($65,400 
at 1997 levels) but only keeps (or receives) enough to contribute the same 
average amount to a PRHA (i.e., an amount equal to 3.4% of average 
covered earnings, about $25,900 at the 1997 level). 
9. Concluding Remarks 
Designing an appropriate way to finance the retirement and healthcare 
benefits of the aging population is probably the most important chal- 
lenge to government finance in the decades ahead. If it is done wisely, 
the aged will have comfortable retirements and the advantages of im- 
proving medical technology while the working population will avoid the 
explosive growth of taxes that could otherwise occur. 
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Comment 
S. RAO AIYAGARI 
University of Rochester 
1. Introduction 
Feldstein and Samwick conclude that a transition to a fully funded social 
security system is likely to have significant benefits to future generations 
while imposing fairly low costs on transition generations. In my discus- 
sion I will first start with a simple overview and then consider a variety 
of issues not addressed adequately in the paper. My conclusion is that 
the case for making a transition to a fully funded system may not be as 
compelling as Feldstein and Samwick suggest and that further quantita- 
Comment 149 
tive analysis to address the issues I discuss would be very helpful in 
evaluating the merits of the authors' suggestion. 
2. Simple Overview 
Let's start with the steady state of a simple Diamond (1965) overlapping 
generations (OG) model with a pay-as-you-go social security system in 
which the return to capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy. Con- 
sider the following policy of transiting to a fully funded system in which 
benefits to the current old are maintained (paid for by taxes on current 
young) but all future benefits and future taxes are eliminated. In the long 
run this implies an increase in the wealth of future generations, since the 
return on capital exceeds the growth rate of the economy. Consequently, 
the direct wealth effect is welfare-increasing for future (long-run) genera- 
tions. For the transition generation (the current young), however, there 
is a decrease in wealth, since they suffer an elimination of benefits but 
no reduction in taxes. Therefore, the direct wealth effect is welfare- 
decreasing for the transition generation. 
In addition to the direct wealth effects there are also indirect effects. 
These arise because there will be an increase in saving by both the future 
generations and the transition generation. For the future generations 
there will be an increase in current consumption, which will be less than 
the increase in current disposable income; and for the transition genera- 
tion there will be a decrease in current consumption with no change in 
current disposable income. These effects raise the capital stock, increase 
the real wage, and decrease the return to capital. 
The welfare consequences of the indirect effects on future genera- 
tions are ambiguous. For the transition generations, at least for those 
close to retirement, the indirect effect is a further decrease in welfare. 
For those transition generations far from retirement the indirect welfare 
effect is again ambiguous. However, for empirically plausible parame- 
ter values the overall welfare effect on future generations is signifi- 
cantly positive (see Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser-hereafter KSW- 
1996). 
3. Discussion 
In my discussion I will question the possible long-run benefits and also 
question the political feasibility of the transition. My discussion will 
focus on the following points: (1) risky returns on capital, (2) heterogene- 
ity in portfolios and wealth, (3) Pareto improvement and capital taxation, 
(4) altruistic bequests; and (5) political economy considerations. 
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3.1 RISKY RETURNS ON CAPITAL 
The return to capital is, of course, highly risky. This fact implies that one 
has to consider the appropriate risk characteristics of the social security 
program and use the appropriate contingent claims prices to evaluate 
whether a change in the program increases or decreases wealth. If the 
taxes and benefits associated with the social security program are risk- 
less, as is commonly modeled, then it is inappropriate to use the ex- 
pected return on capital as measured by the expected return on the 
market portfolio to calculate the wealth effect of eliminating the program. 
The correct procedure is to use the appropriate risk-free rate. For evaluat- 
ing the wealth effect of changes in social security taxes and benefits, it is 
probably reasonable to use some estimate of a long-term risk-free rate. 
Historical ex post real returns on long-term U.S. government bonds are 
close to zero, which is significantly below the expected return on the 
market portfolio. Recently, the U.S. government has started issuing ten- 
year indexed bonds with a real return slightly above 3% per annum. 
Therefore, it seems likely that the long term risk-free rate in the U.S. is 
not only significantly below the expected return on the market portfolio 
but also about the same or perhaps somewhat less than the average 
growth rate of the U.S. economy.1 This means that even in the long run, 
generations that are born when the risk-free rate is above the growth rate 
of the economy will experience an increase in wealth, whereas genera- 
tions that are born in periods when the risk-free rate is below the growth 
rate will experience a decrease in wealth. Since, on average the risk-free 
rate is about the same as or less than the growth rate, about as many 
future generations are likely to lose as are likely to gain by eliminating 
social security. 
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that the taxes and bene- 
fits associated with the social security program are completely riskless. 
However, so long as the risks are uncorrelated with the return on the 
market portfolio, it is not inappropriate to use some estimate of a long- 
term risk-free rate. Of course, if the risks are correlated, then it is a more 
complicated task to evaluate the wealth effect of a change in the social 
security program. This is an issue that bears further scrutiny. 
In this connection one should comment on the authors' assumption 
that the long-run growth rate of real wages (which is the base of social 
security taxes) is about 1.1% per annum. This is significantly lower than 
the long-run growth rate of real GDP, which is in the range of 2-3% per 
annum. The lower growth rate for real wages assumed by the authors 
1. This situation can be quite consistent with dynamic efficiency. See Aiyagari and Peled 
(1991), Manuelli (1990), and Abel et al. (1989). 
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probably reflects several factors, including the discrepancy between cov- 
ered wages and total wages, the widening skill premium, and the in- 
creasing ratio of benefits to wages. Nevertheless, as a steady-state as- 
sumption it seems more appropriate to assume that the growth rate of 
real wages will be in line with the growth rate of real GDP. This makes 
the comparison of the risk-free rate with the growth rate more damaging 
to the authors' calculation of the direct wealth effect of a change in the 
social security program. 
The authors do consider the issue of the riskiness of the return to 
capital in discussing their proposal for prefunding social security bene- 
fits. Initially, the authors suggest that workers be made to save a part of 
their earnings that is just sufficient to replace their social security bene- 
fits, assuming that these savings earn the expected return on the market 
portfolio. Later, in recognition of the riskiness of the return on the mar- 
ket portfolio, they suggest that workers be made to save a somewhat 
larger amount, enough to replace their social security benefits with a 
probability of at least 97%. In my opinion these calculations are mislead- 
ing. To see this, consider how a generation which is saving more due to 
the elimination of social security taxes and benefits should allocate those 
extra savings between risk-free bonds and risky capital. If the risk-free 
rate equals the growth rate, then this generation should put all of its 
extra savings into risk-free bonds. If the risk-free rate is somewhat above 
the growth rate, then it should allocate most of its savings to risk-free 
bonds and a small portion to risky capital. If the risk-free rate is less than 
the growth rate, then it should actually sell some claims to capital and 
allocate more than its extra savings to risk-free bonds. That is, when the 
risk-free rate is about the same as the growth rate, it is never optimal for 
a generation to allocate all of the extra savings to risky capital. Further, 
my previous argument says that a generation born in a period when the 
risk-free rate is less than the growth rate will lose even if it chooses to 
allocate its extra savings optimally between risk-free bonds and capital. There- 
fore, allocating its portfolio in the manner suggested by the authors will 
likely result in a further welfare loss. Such behavior can likely lead to a 
welfare loss even for generations born in periods when the risk-free rate 
is somewhat above the growth rate, even though the direct wealth effect 
is positive. 
The authors' 97% criterion also ignores the potential for enormous 
losses that can result from investing solely in a risky portfolio. It's not 
enough to consider just the probability of a loss; its extent is also relevant 
for risk-averse investors. The fact that over a long horizon stocks are 
almost guaranteed to outperform bonds does not imply that one should 
invest exclusively in stocks. This point goes back to Samuelson (1979) 
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and is illustrated by the following calculations taken from a recent paper 
by Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996). Consider an investor with a 
relative risk aversion coefficient of 5 and a horizon of 40 years who can 
choose between stocks and risk-free bonds. Over that horizon stocks will 
outperform bonds with a probability greater then 97%. Yet, the optimal 
portfolio for such an investor consists of 60% bonds and 40% stocks. 
More interestingly, such an investor will prefer $1 in the optimal portfo- 
lio to $3.86 in a stocks-only portfolio. Even more interestingly, such an 
investor will prefer $1 in a bonds-only portfolio to $2.22 in a stocks-only 
portfolio. Loss probability is not an adequate measure of risk.2 
Taking account of individual risk and its possible dependence on ag- 
gregate shocks along the lines suggested by Mankiw (1986) and Constan- 
tinides and Duffie (1996) suggests that stocks may be even more risky. 
3.2 HETEROGENEITY IN PORTFOLIOS AND RETURNS 
Do a lot of people for whom social security is important earn the high 
expected return on capital in their portfolios that the authors assume in 
their calculations? As is well known, there is considerable heterogeneity 
in wealth, even among members of a given age cohort. Associated with 
this is considerable heterogeneity in portfolios and returns. Essentially, 
people at the lower end of the wealth distribution hold low-risk, low- 
return portfolios, and people at the upper end of the wealth distribution 
hold higher-risk, higher-return portfolios. For example, according to 
U.S. data for 1983 summarized in Kessler and Wolff (1991), people in the 
lowest quintile of the wealth distribution held 82% of their portfolio in 
currency and demand and time deposits, 9% in financial securities and 
corporate stock, 6% in owner-occupied housing, and 3% in other real 
estate and unincorporated business. So it seems to me that people for 
whom social security is likely to be important are earning returns much 
below the expected return on capital and probably more in line with the 
risk-free rate and the growth rate. Some part of this may be due to lack of 
financial sophistication, but I suspect that a large part of it has to do with 
precautionary and liquidity motives which cause these households to 
prefer low-risk, low-return portfolios.3 
2. I should admit that I am proceeding as if observed returns on stocks and bonds were 
consistent with reasonable values of relative risk aversion. This, of course, is not the 
case. But I am not going to deal with the equity-premium and risk-free-rate puzzles 
here. 
3. Going to a fully funded system may increase their savings in the long run so much that 
such households will be able to tap into higher-risk, higher-return assets. But the au- 
thors themselves seem to discount such a possibility, since they indicate that even for 
households near retirement the median financial assets are less than one-half of annual 
earnings. 
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3.3 PARETO IMPROVEMENT AND CAPITAL TAXATION 
There is some discussion in the paper of the possibility of a Pareto- 
improving transition. This arises when the intergenerational redistribu- 
tion implied by the transition is combined with a reform of the tax system 
which reduces distortions. Typically, these proposed reforms involve 
combining capital levies with the elimination of the capital income tax. 
Such a combination is achieved for example, by moving from a system of 
income taxes to a system of consumption taxes. I don't have much to say 
about capital levies except that it would be wonderful to have a one-time 
capital levy every time. However, I would like to suggest that the case for 
eliminating capital income taxation is not so clear-cut. 
When individuals are subject to idiosyncratic shocks which are unin- 
sured, a case can be made for capital taxation. In such situations it can eas- 
ily happen that the aggregate capital stock affects not only the aggregate 
level of consumption but also its distribution among consumers. Individ- 
ual consumers do take into account the effect of their saving on their mean 
level of consumption, but do not take into account its effect on the distri- 
bution of consumption among all consumers. The social planner cares not 
only about the mean level of consumption but also about its distribution 
and would be willing to trade off a slightly lower mean for a slightly less 
disperse distribution. Thus, the social planner would want to tax capital in 
order to have a lower capital stock and less dispersed consumption. 
A simple model with this feature is the following: Consider a two- 
period economy with a continuum of ex ante identical consumers of unit 
measure who receive an endowment of y units in the first period. They 
consume some of this endowment in the first period and save the rest as 
capital (K) for the second period. In the second period they have a random 
and uninsurable idiosyncratic labor endowment denoted by n. Assume 
that E(n) = 1 and, further, that there is a neoclassical production function 
F(K,N) and competitive factor markets. Then a typical individual's 
second-period consumption, denoted by c, is given by c = RK + wn, 
where R = F1(K,1) and w = F2(K,1). Substituting these, we can write c = 
F(K,1) + (n - 1)F2(K,1). It follows that E(c) = F(K,1) and ro(c) = at(n)F2(K, ), 
where Co denotes standard deviation. It can be seen that the aggregate 
capital stock affects not only aggregate consumption but also its distribu- 
tion. Further, since F2(K, 1) is increasing in K, it follows that a higher capital 
stock will increase the dispersion of consumption. In this example, the 
social planner will prefer a smaller capital stock than what would other- 
wise obtain.4 
4. To keep matters simple I have assumed an inelastic labor supply. This raises the possibil- 
ity of taxing labor income at a 100% rate and returning the proceeds in equal per capita 
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Or course, a relevant question is whether this effect is quantitatively 
important. In some previous work of mine on the desirability of taxing 
capital income with incomplete insurance markets (Aiyagari, 1994), I 
found that it was quite possible to get optimal capital income-tax rates in 
the 20-30% range for empirically reasonable values of risk aversion and 
labor supply elasticities. 
Therefore, schemes which rely on reducing or eliminating capital taxa- 
tion to effect a Pareto-improving transition to a fully funded system may 
not look so good once idiosyncratic risk is taken into account. 
KSW (1996) show that a Pareto improvement may be possible if the 
accrued benefits to current and future retirees are financed by a con- 
sumption tax. This is because the consumption tax is in part a capital 
levy on current wealth holders, so that it is equivalent to using lump- 
sum taxes in part to finance the accrued benefits to current and future 
retirees instead of a wage tax. The reduction in the distortion of labor 
supply can generate a Pareto improvement. However, they assume that 
lump-sum redistributions can be used to maintain the welfare of transi- 
tion generations at their pretransition levels. This in itself limits the long- 
run welfare gains. If distortionary taxes have to be used to maintain the 
welfare of transition generations at their pretransition levels, then this 
will further limit the long-run gains from the transition to a fully funded 
system. As KSW also show, if a wage tax is used to pay for the accrued 
benefits to current and future retirees, then the long-run welfare gains 
are even smaller. 
3.4 ALTRUISTIC BEQUESTS 
An interesting idea for modeling that is touched on very briefly in the 
paper is the following: Even if the transition generations are worse off in 
terms of their own utility, if they care about the welfare of their descen- 
dants, then they might be better off overall. Most analyses of social 
security tend to be carried out in models without altruistic bequest mo- 
tives. Yet the very fact that we are all talking about how going to a fully 
funded system would confer such large long-run benefits on future 
generations suggests that this is a modeling feature that needs to be 
studied. 
In this connection the following argument put forward by Bernheim 
(1989) is worth noting. He argued that in a setting in which parents care 
about children altruistically, any equilibrium with positive bequests must 
amount. This would effectively complete the missing insurance market and eliminate 
the need to resort to capital taxation. A simple way around this is to make labor supply 
elastic, which would bring back the optimality of taxing capital income. 
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be suboptimal. The reasoning is quite simple. In an equilibrium with 
positive bequests, reducing the parent's consumption by one unit and 
increasing the child's consumption by one unit will result in a Pareto- 
superior allocation. This is because the parent is no worse off (since he 
was initially making a positive bequest, he must be equating his own 
marginal utility of consumption with that of his child) and the child must 
be better off. 
Applying the above argument to the transition generations in a transi- 
tion to a fully funded system, we can conclude that it is not possible for the 
overall utility of a transition generation (including their valuation of their 
descendants' utility) to increase. The reason is that, if the transition gener- 
ation was making positive bequests, then it would simply reduce its be- 
quests and be no worse off. If such a transition generation was not making 
a bequest, then it must necessarily be worse off, since its own marginal 
utility of consumption must have been higher than its descendants'. 
Taking account of altruistic bequest motives must necessarily reduce 
the potential for long-term welfare gains arising through increased capi- 
tal accumulation. This is quite obvious when there are some dynasties 
which are always bequest-linked, but is less obvious when there are no 
such dynasties. However, so long as some parents are making positive 
bequests some of the time, it is possible for the long-run capital stock not 
to increase at all. To see a simple example of this, consider again a 
version of the Diamond (1965) OG model with a continuum of two- 
period-lived altruistic generations in each period. Assume that the dis- 
count factor that these parents apply to their descendant is random and 
idiosyncratic. A random fraction Ts of each new generation cares highly 
for its children and has a discount factor Ph, whereas the remaining 
fraction cares less for its children and has a discount factor P1 < Ph. 
Assume that the utility from own consumption is of the form cl + u(c2), 
where cl and c2 are the first- and second-period consumptions. I will also 
make a special assumption, which is that parents do not know their 
children's type (high or low discount factor) when they make a bequest, 
i.e., parents do not know whether their own children care a lot or a little 
for their grandchildren. This means that parents cannot condition their 
bequest on their children's type. 
It's now easy to characterize steady states in the above model. Opti- 
mal saving behavior implies that u' (c2) = 1/R, where R is the gross return 
to capital. Optimal bequest behavior implies that u' (c2) P3 with equality 
if bequests are positive. One type of steady state is characterized by R = 
1/h < 1/p1. In such a steady state, parents who happen to care a lot for 
their children will make positive bequests, whereas parents who do not 
care as much for their children will not make bequests. Given the idiosyn- 
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cratic nature of altruism, there will never be any dynasty that is continu- 
ously bequest-linked; once a potential dynasty produces a child who 
doesn't care much for his own child, the bequest link will be broken. 
Despite this feature, the long-run capital stock is pegged by the altruism 
of those parents who care a lot for their children. A transition to a fully 
funded social security system from an unfunded one will create a lot of 
distributional effects, but will have no effect on the long-run capital 
stock, long-run real wage, or long-run per capita consumption. 
Admittedly, the above example is somewhat special, but I think it does 
suggest that taking account of altruistic bequests will further limit long- 
run gains through the channel of increased saving and capital accumula- 
tion from the transition to a fully funded system. So I think that the very 
argument that the transition generations might be better off once they 
take into account the higher welfare of their descendants implies that 
there won't be much gain for future generations on average. 
3.5 POLITICAL-ECONOMY CONSIDERATIONS 
Political-economy considerations are extremely relevant in designing 
transition schemes, as these schemes will have to be politically feasible 
in order to have a chance of being adopted. These considerations help us 
understand why an unfunded system which yields a lower return than 
capital and imposes possibly significant long-run welfare losses is so 
hard to change-see Galasso (1996), Cooley and Soares (1996). The key 
insight here is that from the point of view of many current workers the 
social security taxes they have already paid are sunk costs-what mat- 
ters to them is the taxes yet to be paid and the benefits to be received 
upon retirement. From this perspective it can easily be the case that the 
median voter is one for whom an unfunded system yields a higher 
return than capital. In addition, from the point of view of the median 
voter, continuing an unfunded system results in lower savings and a 
lower capital stock, and hence a higher return on accumulated wealth, 
than does moving to a fully funded system. This latter general equilib- 
rium effect can explain why the median voter might prefer an unfunded 
social security system with an internal rate of return that is lower than 
that on capital. In this connection it is very revealing to consider who are 
the losers in a transition to a fully funded system when there is no 
compensation scheme in place. KSW (1996) provide the information in 
Table 1 based on their simulation model. 
The table, in combination with the result that significant long-run 
benefits are unlikely unless the current retirees and the transition genera- 
tions are made to bear a significant share of the burden of paying off the 
accrued benefits, shows the difficulties in making the transition politi- 
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Table 1 
Losers 
Tax scheme for financing accrued benefits (years of age) 
Consumption tax 34-74 
Income tax 24-74 
Wage tax 13-74 
cally feasible. A majority of existing voters prefer to keep the current 
unfunded system, and most of the people who might benefit from the 
transition to a fully funded system are not around to vote. 
4. Conclusion 
Based on the above considerations I conclude that the case for making a 
transition to a fully funded system may not be as compelling as Feldstein 
and Samwick suggest. Further quantitative analysis to take account of 
the factors I have brought out in my discussion would be very helpful in 
evaluating the merits of this suggestion. 
Editors' Note 
Rao Aiyagari died suddenly on May 20, 1997. He will be greatly missed. 
The Editors thank Rao's colleague Per Krusell for helping us obtain the 
above discussion. We hope that it will serve as a small reminder of Rao's 
keen intelligence and insight. 
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Comment 
LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF 
Boston University and NBER 
Feldstein and Samwick have produced a provocative, challenging, and 
useful paper. It's provocative in claiming that we can privatize social 
security in a manner that will yield very significant long-run welfare 
gains. It's challenging in asking the reader to wade through a host of 
welfare, excess-burden, rate-of-return, capital-accumulation, and risk- 
adjustment calculations. And it's useful in clarifying an important way 
in which social security might be reformed. 
The paper begins with a description of the long-term fiscal fiasco being 
produced in Washington through the unrestrained growth of pay-as- 
you-go entitlement programs. Feldstein and Samwick point out that 
raising payroll taxes to cover social security and Medicare benefits on a 
pay-as-you-go basis will leave our children paying over a third of their 
lifetime earnings in payroll taxes alone. This assessment is based on the 
social security actuaries' intermediate projections. It's important to real- 
ize that the intermediate projections made by social security actuaries are 
routinely overoptimistic. The current intermediate projections appear to 
be particularly optimistic with respect to real wage growth, which in 
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recent years has been running at less than one-third the rate assumed by 
the actuaries, and with respect to future longevity improvements, which 
our country's top demographers think are way off base. It's also impor- 
tant to realize that the problem is not just demographics. If the CPI 
commission is right, real social security benefits are rising by as much as 
1.5% more each year than they should be. And real Medicare benefits 
continue to grow many times faster than the economy. Indeed, over the 
last four years alone, real Medicare benefits per beneficiary grew by one- 
quarter. Last year, real Medicare benefits per beneficiary grew 12 times 
faster than the real wages of the workers paying for those benefits. 
June O'Neill, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, recently 
summarized the long-term fiscal situation in a way which I think is par- 
ticularly useful. She pointed out that were we to pay for all of the govern- 
ment's entitlement and other spending commitments over the next 75 
years with an immediate and permanent increase in federal income-tax 
rates, the requisite rate hike would be 50%. Were we to wait for five years 
to raise income-tax rates the necessary tax hike would be 56%. And were 
we to wait for 20 years, the requisite tax hike would be 87%. 
Clearly, we need to take drastic actions to avoid taxing our economy to 
death. Privatizing social security, the authors claim, is one of them. Their 
personal retirement system would, over time, fully privatize social secu- 
rity and completely eliminate the distortionary social security payroll 
tax. 
Although the authors put the best spin on their proposal, in essence it 
boils down to making current workers pay off social security's unfunded 
liability. Under their plan, workers receive their accrued social security 
benefits (i.e., the benefits they've earned based on past contributions), 
but are forced to pay social security taxes for many years in the future 
without receiving any additional benefits back in exchange for any of 
these taxes. That's the bad news because, as the authors tell us, under 
the existing system we can, on average, expect to get back about one 
dollar in benefits, measured in present value, for every four dollars we 
are forced to pay in social security taxes. For workers currently nearer to 
retirement the bad news is, however, worse than that calculation sug- 
gests. The reason is that under social security's current structure, the 
marginal present value of benefits one gets in exchange for marginal 
contributions is higher for older workers, because they are closer to 
receiving their benefits. Hence these older workers have the most to lose 
under the Feldstein-Samwick plan. 
The good news is that because current workers will only get their 
prereform accrued social security benefits in retirement, the amount of 
payroll taxes needed to cover aggregate social security benefits will de- 
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dine over time, ultimately to zero. This zero long-run social security 
payroll tax can be compared with the 18.75% tax rate that would prevail 
under the existing system were we to annually adjust payroll tax rates to 
meet annual social security benefit payments. Getting our kids out from 
under an 18.75% payroll tax will, obviously, help them a lot. The interest- 
ing thing we lear from Feldstein and Samwick is that helping our kids 
out a lot can be done at a fairly small cost to us. 
In addition to eliminating the accrual of additional social security bene- 
fits and altering the time path of social security payroll tax rates, the 
personal retirement system forces people to place, on average, about 2% 
of their earnings in a private account. The precise size of this mandatory 
saving is cohort-specific, with the rate of contribution set to ensure that 
one's PRA account plus prereform accrued social security benefits will 
deliver the level of retirement income that would be received under the 
current system. 
Although the authors will disagree, I view this mandatory saving as a 
sideshow. Since most American workers are not, in my view, liquidity- 
constrained, I believe they would respond to this mandatory saving by 
cutting back on their own private saving; i.e., I think their retirement 
income would end up the same whether or not the personal retirement 
system included the mandatory PRA contribution. This undoing of the 
mandatory PRA contribution can take many forms, including cutting 
back on 401(k), 403(b), IRA, and other tax-deferred contributions. 
Once I separate the social security and mandatory PRA elements of 
the proposal, I start to wonder about the legitimacy of some of the 
authors' calculations. To begin with, I wonder what it means to let the 
PRAs accumulate capital income entirely tax-free. If workers do what I 
think they'll do and simply put assets they have already accumulated or 
would otherwise accumulate into the PRAs, the government will, on 
balance, be out the corporate income taxes and the personal capital 
income taxes that would otherwise be earned on the income from these 
assets. Since Feldstein and Samwick don't include the cost to workers of 
paying additional other taxes to make up the loss in federal revenues, I 
wonder if they are overstating the welfare gains of their plan. 
Of course, based on the authors' maintained assumption-that each 
dollar contributed to PRAs represents an additional dollar of net national 
saving-there is no loss in federal revenue. But this extreme liquidity- 
constrained Keynesian view has, in my view, no empirical basis. 
Viewing the mandatory PRA contributions, as I do, as simply a 
relabeling of private saving also leads me to question Feldstein and 
Samwick's effective payroll tax rate during the transition. They seem to 
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treat the PRA contribution as a tax, when it's not, and they also seem to 
assume that workers will still get something back at the margin for 
contributing to social security, which, if I understand things right, they 
won't. The mistakes here, if they are mistakes, are, however, likely to be 
small and offsetting. Once again, my reference point for thinking about 
these issues is the life-cycle model. But even under their assumption that 
workers are 100% liquidity-constrained at the margin, a dollar contrib- 
uted to a PRA should be valued at more than zero. 
My view of the PRA contributions also leads me to question Feldstein 
and Samwick's calculations of the effect of capital accumulation. I don't 
think the PRAs per se will alter capital accumulation, since every dollar 
in a PRA is likely to be matched by a dollar less in a non-PRA account. I 
think that the main effect on capital accumulation will arise from making 
current workers pay off the current system's accrued liability. In lower- 
ing their remaining lifetime incomes (by giving them a zero gross rate of 
return on their marginal social security contributions), the proposal will 
lower their consumption and, thereby, reduce aggregate consumption 
and raise national saving. 
I also have to admit to being worried about Table 5's deadweight-loss 
calculation. Even assuming the reduction in effective tax rates is cor- 
rectly calculated, I don't understand how the long-run decline in the rate 
of social security taxation can be added to reductions in deadweight 
losses. We know that, for the intertemporal economy as a whole, the 
only welfare gains are those arising from efficiency improvements. Feld- 
stein and Samwick seem to be acknowledging this in leaving out of their 
calculation the offsetting effects of changes in factor income arising from 
the policy's affect on capital accumulation, but they don't seem to realize 
that the same is true of reductions in net taxes. Apart from efficiency 
gains, the government's intertemporal budget constraint tells us that, 
discounted at the future time path of the economy's marginal product of 
capital, the benefits to future generations of lowering their net tax pay- 
ments is exactly offset by the costs to current generations of paying 
higher net taxes. Given the presence of the tax terms in Table 5, and 
given that Feldstein and Samwick are not discounting at the marginal 
product of capital, but at a much lower rate, I'm led to view Table 5 as a 
social-welfare calculation that assumes that the United States is a small 
open economy whose factor prices are set from abroad. Considered as a 
social-welfare calculation, Table 5 does not represent a purely scientific 
description of what happens to particular cohorts. Instead, it represents 
the authors' personal weighting of income in the present vs. income in 
the future. 
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Table 6's cohort-specific net welfare gains should and do include the 
welfare effects of changes in their net taxes, but they leave out the 
welfare effects of factor price changes. This is likely to be a big omission. 
My bottom line here is that, while I agree with the paper's broad 
conclusions, I question the precise way the paper reaches many of them. 
The reason I agree with their broad conclusions is that, together with 
Kent Smetters and Jan Walliser of the CBO, I've simulated the kind of 
transition Feldstein and Samwick are considering, albeit in a quite styl- 
ized model, and obtained qualitatively similar results. The advantage of 
using a model like ours that has an explicit utility function is that there is 
no need to approximate excess burdens. In addition, one can display the 
precise changes in utility of each cohort and of each member within a 
cohort. Hence, policy-induced welfare changes can be presented for each 
and every agent without the need to make interpersonal comparisons. 
Discussion 
The authors began the discussion by responding to the formal com- 
ments. Andrew Samwick emphasized that their plan would not change 
the benefits paid in retirement, only the time pattern of taxes, as needed 
to pay for the transition. He disagreed with the argument that their 
proposal would reduce private savings, on the grounds that-given that 
50% of the population have less than six months of income going into 
retirement and that 60% of the population hold no stock-there is little 
scope for an offsetting response. Feldstein also argued against the likeli- 
hood of a substantial endogenous response of saving in practice, contend- 
ing that Kotlikoff's simulation results rely too heavily on the assumption 
of full optimization by consumers. He suggested that the evidence on 
ownership of financial assets, cited by Samwick, weighs against the con- 
clusion that people are fully forward-looking in their behavior. 
Matthew Shapiro questioned the source of the low 2% tax rate neces- 
sary to pay for the transition. He suggested that the tax burden would be 
twice that without the corporate income tax rebate; thus the paper is 
arguably more about corporate income tax policy than about social secu- 
rity. Feldstein disagreed, noting that the proposed corporate tax rebate 
would apply only to the returns to incremental capital, not to all corpo- 
rate revenues. 
Continuing on the theme of what the paper is "really" about, Greg 
Mankiw thought the paper's core idea was exploiting the power of com- 
pound interest. Essentially the proposal is to confiscate resources from 
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the current generation, invest them, then use the compounded returns 
to mitigate the tax burden of future generations. An interesting question 
is why people do not take of advantage of the supposedly high real 
return to capital on their own, without government coercion. One possi- 
ble answer is disincentives created by the tax system. A second possibil- 
ity is "myopic" behavior by the public, as suggested by the work of Chris 
Carroll on buffer stock saving. Mankiw questioned the political feasibility 
of a plan that mandates savings given the public's apparent preference 
for holding low levels of financial assets. Responding, Carroll cautioned 
that it was important to remember what drove the results of his work. In 
particular, it is not myopia or irrationality per se: Indeed, his models 
assume a moderate rate of time preference (e.g., 4% per year) and rapid 
growth in income over the life cycle (implying that most saving should be 
done later in life). More important to his results is his assumption, moti- 
vated by the fact that most people do not own stocks, that consumers 
face a real riskless interest rate that is close to zero. Carroll conjectured 
that, in his models, agents would respond to a 9% real rate of return by 
saving considerably more, and perhaps by investing in risky assets. 
Robert Hall put forth the view that the calculations of the paper were 
driven primarily by the so-called equity-premium puzzle, although in 
this paper the assumed premium is on physical capital rather than on 
stocks per se. He argued that the difference between the historical return 
on capital and the risk-free rate cannot be justified by reasonable levels 
of risk aversion, and therefore presents an arbitrage opportunity for the 
government that applies more generally than to social security. The logi- 
cal implication of this paper, he suggested, is that the government 
should either borrow or raise taxes, invest the proceeds in capital (or 
stocks), and use the high returns to finance other types of government 
expenditure as well. 
Angus Deaton brought up the issue of distributional effects. Looking 
at any given cohort over time, one finds income inequality increasing as 
the cohort gets older. This phenomenon implies that, if a fixed percent- 
age of wages is earmarked for PRAs, the dispersion in PRA balances 
would be increasing with age (and at a faster rate than the dispersion in 
earnings). Further, if returns are positively correlated with the amounts 
in the PRAs, a Rao Aiyagari suggested, then this plan could easily gener- 
ate substantial wealth inequality. Feldstein agreed that this is an issue 
and mentioned some early experimentation they performed to consider 
it. Using empirical earnings profiles, they found that a redistributive 
scheme designed to prevent anyone from falling below half the median 
income in retirement could be financed by a tax rate of 2.5%. It would 
also be possible to give differential rebates on the corporate tax in order 
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to generate higher real returns for people in the lower brackets. In sum, 
Feldstein suggested that there would be ample flexibility in their plan to 
eliminate poverty among the retired, although perhaps not inequality 
per se. Kotlikoff did not agree with the concern over inequality, since 
liquidity-constrained people would be forced to save more and thus 
would end up wealthier than they would have otherwise. Deaton re- 
sponded that a person who was unemployed at different times of his or 
her life, and who kept most savings in the form of cash, would likely end 
up with a very inadequate sum in the PRA. Feldstein remarked that the 
corporate tax rate would help even very risk-averse individuals who 
refuse to hold stocks, as those people would get an extra 3% return even 
on bonds. 
Bennett McCallum wondered why the focus of the paper was initially 
on the problem of an aging population when the benefits of PRAs are 
independent of any demographic issue. If the problem is basically 
demographic, why not focus on proposals such as advancing the retire- 
ment age? Feldstein agreed that raising the retirement age is an option 
but that it would not be enough, particularly for Medicare. He pointed 
out that their paper showed that approaches such as increasing the 
retirement age may not even be necessary. Mark Bils followed up on 
the issue of the retirement age by noting that it distorts investment in 
human capital and removes one way to adjust to risk, i.e., working 
longer rather than reducing consumption. Feldstein remarked that, in 
this regard, current social security reforms were steps in the right direc- 
tion. These reforms are not only increasing the age of retirement but 
include actuarial adjustments, so that if one chooses to work longer the 
benefits eventually collected will increase appropriately. 
